United Nations S/2017/482

Security Council

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9 June 2017
English
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**Identical letters dated 7 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

On the evening of Tuesday, 6 June 2017, the illegitimate "international coalition" led by the United States of America committed yet another flagrant and serious attack on Syrian Arab Army forces fighting the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syrian territory. That attack killed a number of Syrian Arab Army soldiers and caused material damage.

This most recent aggression clearly reveals the true objectives of that illegitimate coalition, and they have nothing to do with the stated objective of the Governments of its member States, which is to combat ISIL. The true objectives are to undermine the steadfastness of the Syrian Arab Republic and its army and to weaken the country by prolonging the terrorist war.

On 5 June 2017, the forces of that dubious and illegitimate coalition committed another horrifying massacre of Syrians, when 12 civilians, including women and children, were killed in a coalition airstrike on the city of Raqqah.

The crimes committed by the illegitimate coalition provide the clearest evidence that the United States of America and the Governments of coalition member States are manipulating global public opinion and misleading the Security Council in particular. The United States of America falsely claims to respect international humanitarian law and human rights while leading a coalition that engages in terrorism and violates international humanitarian law, the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions on the situation in Syria, all of which emphasize the need to respect the sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic, the unity of its people and its territorial integrity.

The Syrian Arab Republic once again condemns in the strongest possible terms the repeated attacks by the illegitimate coalition on the Syrian Arab Army, which is at the forefront of a relentless fight against the terrorism of ISIL, the Nusrah Front and other terrorist organizations. Syria warns the illegitimate coalition that escalation carries risks and has ramifications. It calls on the Governments of the United States of America and coalition member States to desist from carrying out such horrific attacks, which in fact only strengthen ISIL at a time when the Syrian Arab Army and allied forces have been making daily inroads against terrorist organizations.

The repeated attacks by the illegitimate coalition on the Syrian Arab Army, Syrian civilians and infrastructure must stop; any continuation of these attacks

would constitute support for terrorism and threaten the security and stability of the region and the world.

The Syrian Arab Republic calls on the Security Council to uphold its responsibilities and respond to these attacks against the sovereignty of Syria, the Syrian Arab Army and innocent civilians. It must hold the Governments of the States members of the illegitimate coalition accountable for the crimes they have committed in Syria, before such attacks, which can no longer be condoned, justified or ignored, become even more severe.

I should be grateful if these identical letters could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Louay **Falouh**
Minister Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2017/483

Security Council

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7 June 2017
English
Original: French

# Letter dated 7 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw the attention of the Security Council to the regrettable events related to the militia of the customary chief Kamwina Nsapu in the Kasai provinces and to convey to the Council the positive reaction of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo transmitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in response to his request for a joint investigation of those events (see annex I).

Also enclosed with this letter is the road map on cooperation between my Government and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in connection with the investigations into human rights violations committed in the said provinces (see annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ignace **Gata Mavita**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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## Annex I to the letter dated 7 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

## Letter dated 6 June 2017 from the Minister of Human Rights of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, through the Ministry of Human Rights, has taken note of the statement you made on Tuesday, 6 June 2017, at the opening of the thirty-fifth session of the Human Rights Council, with reference to the regrettable events related to the militia of the customary chief Kamwina Nsapu in the Kasai provinces.

As I was obliged to underscore when you were kind enough to meet with me on 4 May 2017 in Geneva, the Government of the Republic, upon the instructions of the country's highest leadership, is determined to punish all serious human rights violations committed in that part of the Republic, whoever the perpetrators are, and stands ready to cooperate with the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), with a view to establishing the truth in relation to those events. In that regard, the road map communicated to you on 24 May 2017 amply demonstrates this willingness (see annex II).

I wish to reiterate once again the willingness of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to continue the investigations in the Kamwina Nsapu case begun jointly with those two United Nations entities almost three months ago; however, we wish the Congolese judiciary to maintain the lead role in the investigations. Nonetheless, we would be very grateful if MONUSCO and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office could make forensic experts, and any other technical support, available to us, with a view to bringing the investigations to a successful conclusion.

With regard to the murder of Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalan, I should like to point out that the trial was begun on Monday 5 June in Kananga, and the next hearing will take place on 12 June. To that end, we invite the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, MONUSCO and all non-governmental organizations involved in the protection of human rights to send their representatives to attend the trial.

Since I will be in Geneva next week with my colleague, the Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals, Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, and with the Personal Representative of the Head of State for combating sexual violence and child recruitment, Jeanine Mabunda, in order to take part in the interactive dialogue on the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I stand ready to continue discussions with you and/or with your Representative based in Kinshasa, José María Aranaz.

(*Signed*) Marie-Ange **Mushobekwa L.**

## Annex II to the letter dated 7 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

## Letter dated 24 May 2017 from the Minister of Human Rights of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Director of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office and Representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Further to my letter sent to you on 9 May 2017, concerning my meeting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 4 May 2017, I have the honour to transmit herewith the road map on cooperation between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in connection with the investigations into serious human rights violations committed in the Kasai provinces (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Marie-Ange **Mushobekwa L.**

## Enclosure

### Draft road map between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office with a view to achieving transparent and credible investigations into serious human rights violations in the Kasai provinces

| *A* | *Fundamental principles to be observed in the cooperation between the Government and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office* | *References* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The Government's primary responsibility for the protection of human rights throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo | Constitution of the Republic; Human Rights Council resolutions |
| 2 | Full respect for the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo | Charter of the United Nations; Constitutive Act of the African Union |
| 3 | Respect for the independence of the national judiciary and the subsidiary nature of recourse to international courts and tribunals | Constitution of the Republic; statutes of international courts and tribunals |
| 4 | The impartial and objective treatment (non-selective, non-sensational and without political interference) of all information and intelligence | National and international legal instruments |
| 5 | Respect for the confidentiality of the investigation | |

| *B* | *Actions* | *Time frame* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Letter from the Minister of Human Rights addressed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, following their meeting on 4 May 2017 in Geneva | Tuesday, 9 May 2017 |
| 2 | Meeting of the task force (i.e., Minister of State, Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals; Minister of Defence; Minister of Human Rights; Prosecutor General of Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo; Personal Representative of the Head of State for combating sexual violence and child recruitment) with the Director of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to discuss the road map | Friday, 19 May 2017 |
| 3 | Detailed road map proposed by the Minister of Human Rights to the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office and discussions between the parties to reach agreement | Monday, 22 May 2017 |
| 4 | Meeting between the task force and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office to evaluate and reach agreement on the road map | Friday, 26 May 2017 |
| 5 | Weekly meetings of the task force and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office to evaluate progress made in combating impunity for serious human rights violations in Kasai | Every Friday, i.e., four meetings per month |

| C | *Areas of cooperation between the two parties* | *Time frame* |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Provision by the Congolese Government of logistical and technical resources to the national commission of inquiry; recourse to international partners (African Union, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and United Nations Joint Human Rights Office) | Monday, 29 May to Wednesday, 28 June 2017 |
| 2 | Material support by the Congolese Government and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office to establish mobile courts for the promotion and protection of human rights | Friday, 2 June to Monday, 3 July 2017 |
| 3 | Capacity-building for human rights investigators, national forensic police officers, and civil and military judges | Monday, 29 May to Thursday, 29 June 2017 |
| 4 | Material support by the Congolese Government to the Commission of Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo on combating sexual violence | Monday, 29 May to Wednesday, 7 June 2017 |
| 5 | Humanitarian assistance for the 15,000 Congolese refugees in Angola and more than one million internally displaced persons | Monday, 22 May to Monday, 24 July 2017 |
| 6 | Monitoring of cases of sexual violence and identification of those guilty of using children as human shields; sharing of judicial information held by the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office | Monday, 29 May to Monday, 12 June 2017 |
| 7 | Visit by the senior military prosecutors of the former Kasai Occidental and former Kasai Oriental, together with experts from the prosecution support cells and the Geographical Institute, as well as forensic experts, to the sites where mass graves have been identified, for the purposes of jointly:<br>(a) Mapping the mass graves<br>(b) Mapping the presence of units of Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo, with an indication of the dates of operations conducted | Thursday, 15 June to Thursday, 22 June 2017 |
| 8 | Meeting between the senior military prosecutors of the Kasai provinces, the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office and the prosecution support cells in Mbuji-Mayi and Kananga to share the information obtained | Friday, 23 June 2017 |
| 9 | Transmission of the judicial mission's report, including the results of the mapping exercises, to the Prosecutor's Office of Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo | Monday, 26 June to Thursday, 29 June 2017 |
| 10 | Transmission by the senior military prosecutors of the former Kasai Occidental and former Kasai Oriental, to the MONUSCO prosecution support cells covering the five Grand Kasai provinces, of a request for support | Monday, 3 July to Friday, 7 July 2017 |
| 11 | Follow-up meeting in Kinshasa between the task force and the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office | Friday, 14 July 2017 |
| 12 | Start of the investigations with the requested support | As from Monday, 17 July 2017 |
| 13 | Direct support to the Government in carrying out peace awareness activities: support for the government initiative to organize a forum on peace and reconciliation in the Kasai provinces | Monday, 24 July to Thursday, 27 July 2017 |

Done at Kinshasa, 22 May 2017
(*Signed*) Marie-Ange **Mushobekwa L.**

United Nations S/2017/484

Security Council

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7 June 2017

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# Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of France on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 7 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations stating that Mr. Samer Melki and Mr. Antoine Michon have been appointed alternate representatives of France on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

17-09321 (E) 090617

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United Nations A/71/927–S/2017/485

General Assembly
Security Council

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13 June 2017

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**General Assembly**
**Seventy-first session**
Agenda item 61
**Peacebuilding and sustaining peace**

**Security Council**
**Seventy-second year**

## Letter dated 6 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the Chair's summary of the first meeting of the Women and Peace and Security National Focal Points Network, held in Alicante, Spain, on 26 and 27 April 2017 (see annex I), and the joint communiqué adopted on that occasion (see annex II). This initiative was launched on 23 September 2016 on the margins of the ministerial week of the General Assembly.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Román **Oyarzun**

17-09717 (E) 200617

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## Annex I to the letter dated 6 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

# Chair's summary of the first meeting of the Women and Peace and Security National Focal Points Network

**Alicante, Spain, 26 and 27 April 2017**

### Introduction

The Women and Peace and Security National Focal Points Network is a cross-regional forum of representatives of Governments and regional and international organizations. The Network provides a space in which to exchange experiences and best practices on women and peace and security from the national and regional perspectives and was created as a tool to improve national and regional performance in this field.

In the joint communiqué of the founding meeting of the Network, held in New York in September 2016, members affirmed their commitment to advancing the participation of women in decision-making on peace and security, as well as in peace and security policies and programmes at the national level. They acknowledged that Member States bore the primary responsibility for integrating commitments on women and peace and security into domestic policies and normative frameworks, and reaffirmed their commitment to promoting the development and implementation of national action plans and strategies on women and peace and security. Recognizing the need to articulate the impact of national action plans more effectively, the focal points decided to continue to develop strategies for the enhanced design and implementation of high-impact national action plans.

To further fulfil this commitment, the first meeting of the Network, held in Alicante, Spain, on 26 and 27 April 2017, was focused on national action plans for women and peace and security. National action plans are a recommendation generated by Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) as one tool to systematically integrate gender into national, regional or international peace and security efforts. Countries are encouraged to develop national action plans to take the larger goals of resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions and contextualize them in national, domestic or foreign policy objectives.

The two-day meeting brought together more than 100 national focal points, Government actors and civil society representatives from 61 countries. Following plenary sessions on the morning of the first day, participants broke into three working groups on the following topics of emerging importance for national action plans: addressing structural barriers to gender equality, civil society engagement in the design and implementation of national action plans and preventing or countering violent extremism and national action plans. The second day featured discussions with international and regional representatives, a session on high-impact national action plans and closing remarks centred on actions and next steps for the Network.

### Opening plenary sessions

The opening plenary session featured welcoming remarks by the Director of Casa Mediterráneo, Miguel Oliveros, followed by opening remarks by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Spain, Ildefonso Castro. The Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, Román Oyarzun Marchesi, then moderated a discussion with:

(a) The Minister of Women Affairs and Social Development of Nigeria, Aisha Jummai al-Hassan;

(b) The Undersecretary for Peacebuilding and Development and Director of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process of the Philippines, Diosita T. Andot;

(c) The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation of Namibia, Selma Ashipala-Musvayi;

(d) The Assistant Secretary-General and Deputy Executive Director for Policy and Programme for the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), Yannick Glemarec.

The wide-ranging discussion underscored the continued importance of the women and peace and security agenda, especially given that traditional security responses are no longer sufficient to address modern threats and instabilities. Mr. Oyarzun emphasized how critical national action plans could be in implementing resolution 1325 (2000), and encouraged focal points to return to their posts and build support for the agenda, including by raising awareness thereof among ministries, such as of the interior and of defence, and the President's office, which might not be directly working on those issues. The representatives of Nigeria, the Philippines, Namibia and UN-Women then shared their national or organizational experiences with national action plans or national gender, peace or security policies. Ms. Jummai al-Hassan spoke about the Nigerian national action plan, and noted that the concept of security had been expanded in the second revision of the plan to include issues of violent extremism, trauma healing and disarmament and demobilization, in addition to the inclusion of local or zonal action plans to further localize those issues. Ms. Andot reflected on the experience of the Philippines and the launch of its third national action plan, in 2017. That iteration incorporated emerging domestic concerns, such as ethnic and intercommunal violence, terrorism and organized crime, and made special efforts to support women's organizations and economic empowerment programmes. Ms. Ashipala-Musvayi said that the forthcoming national action plan of Namibia had been created through intragovernmental brainstorming sessions. She noted that the comprehensive gender policies of Namibia had helped to address structural barriers to the participation of women in the security sector. She said that Namibia offered to host the Network meeting in 2019. Lastly, Mr. Glemarec touched on the need for national action plans to be flexible in order to be able to more readily address emerging peace and security concerns.

Following the opening plenary session, a grounding session was held on emerging trends and national action plans. The Director of the Human Rights Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Spain, Adela Díaz Bernárdez, opened the session by providing the context in which the topics had been selected and outlining the goals for the day's working group sessions. The Vice-Chair of Inclusive Security, Mirsad Jacevic, provided a bigger picture of the status of national action plans on women and peace and security around the world, noting that, to date, more than 65 national action plans had been created or were in process, with more than 20 countries on their second or third plan. Three speakers then introduced the following focus topics of the working groups and provided greater context to these issues in their own experiences:

(a) Structural barriers to gender equality: Policy Adviser and Military Liaison Officer of the Peace and Security Section of UN-Women, Jennifer Wittwer;

(b) Civil society engagement in the design and implementation of national action plans: European External Action Service Principal Adviser on Gender and on

the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women and Peace and Security, Mara Marinaki;

(c) Preventing or countering violent extremism and national action plans: Director of the Africa and Asia Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, Mariame Sy.

While not exhaustive, the following is a summary of the key points and recommendations from the remarks and working group sessions. Several trends and recommendations emerged across the working groups. In the plenary report, all rapporteurs noted a need for better collaboration across international and regional bodies, national and local governments and civil society organizations. Representatives also stressed the importance of cultivating political will and champions for the Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) agenda, in particular in security sector institutions, and noted that gender equality and a gender perspective should be seen as a holistic framework across various dimensions, including human resources management, operational planning and conduct, special measures to reduce exclusions to the participation of women and strategic direction in peace and security agencies. One intervention that might persuade these actors was the generation of a larger body of rigorous empirical research, a point championed by focal points and representatives. Such research and all national action plans should directly consider the diversity of the experiences of women and girls in conflict, both in terms of intersectionalities and underrepresented populations, as well as the very different roles played by women during conflict. Lastly, each working group stressed how critical it was to have civil society engagement throughout the creation, implementation and evaluation of national action plans.

**Addressing structural barriers to gender equality**

The working group on addressing structural barriers to gender equality was facilitated by Ms. Wittwer, with statements by the Algerian Senator and Adviser on Mediation of the Toledo International Centre for Peace, Hafida Benchehida, the Director General for Human Rights and Women's International Affairs of Afghanistan, Abeda Osman, and the Director of the Women's Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Argentina, María Luisa Martino.

Representatives recognized that national action plans on women and peace and security had the potential to address structural barriers preventing the participation of women in the domain of peace and security. The working group discussed challenges and strategies relating to structural barriers to gender equality, with a particular emphasis on barriers within the security sector, although some also referred to mediation and diplomacy. The group agreed that key challenges included communication around the women and peace and security agenda, both in terms of the lack of knowledge of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and the lack of effective exchange between diplomats, agencies and civil society. Another challenge was the difficulty of integrating a gender perspective into peace and security efforts and its effect on operational outcomes and leadership.

Representatives shared strategies and examples of how nations and organizations had been able to address structural barriers. Strategies included the provision of broader and more strategic training within peace and security agencies to help to close the communication and political gaps at all levels. Second, the working group said that women and peace and security measures should be institutionalized within legislation, doctrine and planning and business processes, and, as necessary, include targets, quotas or special measures to achieve specific goals and eliminate discriminatory practices. Another important aspect of institutionalization was the need to embed the women and peace and security

principles into each Government's approach to the human resources management of personnel in peace and security agencies, by ensuring equal access to all opportunities regardless of gender.

Representatives stressed that it was critical that, in addition to mainstreaming within institutional policies, senior leaders promote and thoroughly implement women and peace and security principles in their work, demonstrating their commitment through leadership. They should also promote and implement gender integration and diversity as a way to improve comprehensive approaches and operational effectiveness.

**Civil society engagement in the design and implementation of national action plans**

The working group on civil society engagement in the design and implementation of national action plans was facilitated by a Researcher at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, María Villellas, with interventions from the Director General for International Order, the United Nations and Arms Control at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Patricia Flor, a Senior Legal Officer from Sierra Leone, Ashmia Sesay, and the International Coordinator of the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, Mavic Cabrera-Balleza.

Participants reaffirmed the importance of identifying and promoting partnerships with civil society and local organizations working on women and peace and security issues. They welcomed the critical contributions made by civil society to the development and implementation of high-impact national action plans. The working group acknowledged the benefits that an inclusive approach to the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes of national action plans brought to often limited time and resources. Participants also referred to the importance of the involvement of civil society representatives from the beginning of a national action plan, not simply including them in a one-off consultation after drafting. This sustained participation also helped to create a sense of ownership among civil society representatives, who were often the primary implementers of national action plan activities. Inclusive and collaborative approaches to the implementation of women and peace and security also required a stronger connection between the agenda and a variety of existing monitoring and reporting systems, including the universal periodic review and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, using its general recommendation No. 30 (2013) on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations.

The working group noted significant challenges to sustained civil society engagement and support, such as a lack of dedicated funding for participation and difficulty institutionalizing their contributions throughout a national action plan process. They discussed interventions to address those challenges, including measures to formalize civil society representation in national action plan committees or working groups, and the importance of the self-selection of civil society representatives. One participant suggested that that could help to address the perception of "civil society on demand", whereby whoever could attend a national action plan meeting was invited at the last moment. Institutionalizing participation also reduced the reliance on the presence or advocacy of good actors within Government to extend an invitation and instead made participation part of standard practice. Lastly, another challenge highlighted was that most civil society engagement happened at the national level, but implementation was more likely to occur outside the capital. One potential solution was the creation of national action plan steering committees at both the national and local levels that could provide both input and feedback on national action plan activities.

**Preventing or countering violent extremism and national action plans**

The working group on preventing or countering violent extremism and national action plans was facilitated by the Ambassador for Women and Peace and Security of Finland, Ann-Sofie Stude, with statements from the Office Director at the Institute for Security Studies in Dakar, Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, the Deputy Director for Human Rights and Democracy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Véronique Joosten, and the Principal Gender Officer at the Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs of Kenya, Mary Kaburu.

Participants emphasized the importance of aligning national women and peace and security strategies with any related plans and policies aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism. There was a significant discussion on the terminology around violent extremism, as focal points noted that their countries referred to those strategies or activities using a wide variety of terms, including preventing and countering violent extremism, insurgency, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and stabilization. Although there was no determinative recommendation on whether and how gender should be integrated into a nation's policy on preventing and countering violent extremism or, conversely, how those topics should be included within a national action plan on women and peace and security, focal points emphasized the importance of coherence and harmonization between such policies. An important distinction, noted by one participant, was that a plan for preventing and countering violent extremism might consider drivers of violent extremism for both men and women and interventions that addressed the entire community, whereas the national action plan on women and peace and security looked more conscientiously at women, girls and gendered approaches. Representatives noted that, when plans and strategies did not include a gender perspective, there was a risk of gaps in their design and implementation and the ineffective use of limited resources. The working group also discussed the need to cultivate champions within security sector institutions to ensure that all the right actors were at the table during the formulation of such plans. They suggested providing persuasive operational-effectiveness arguments and capacity-building for security actors tasked with drafting policies or making them operational. Multiple participants noted that the process of creating a national action plan could become a productive opportunity to educate and persuade security actors of the importance of including a gender perspective and to provide practical guidance for what that meant in the context of policies, plans and strategies.

The working group recommended conducting or collecting research at the national and subnational levels in order to better understand the specific roles of women in the prevention of and participation in violent extremism and to ensure that responses were localized and context-specific. While religion was discussed as an important consideration in understanding how to prevent or counter violent extremism, participants also noted important drivers, such as limited economic opportunity, insufficient educational systems, political instability and youth bulges, all of which needed to be better understood from a gender perspective. Lastly, participants echoed the importance of civil society participation, noting that civil society engagement in the design and implementation of programming for preventing and countering violent extremism was critical to providing timely, ground-tested and community-sensitive responses to violent extremism.

**National action plans from the regional and international perspectives**

Focal points can champion the women and peace and security agenda at the regional and international levels. The second day began with a panel featuring international and regional organizations reflecting upon regional action plans and

their internal policies and programmes in place to address peace and security. The Deputy Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations, Carolyn Schwalger, moderated a discussion with representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), UN-Women and the Union for the Mediterranean, who shared specific examples of their initiatives and some challenges in fully implementing Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). All speakers reiterated the need for coherence and coordination among international, regional and national policies on women and peace and security. The representative of ECOWAS, Onyinye Onwuka, and the representative of NATO, Hildur Sigurdardottir, provided details of their regional and organizational plans on women and peace and security, highlighting how those strategies had helped to institutionalize a gender perspective in their work. The representative of UN-Women in Asia and the Pacific, Hanny Cueva-Beteta, presented findings from a recent symposium and a report reviewing the region's nine national action plans for common themes and emerging topics, such as violent extremism, climate change and humanitarian crises. Lastly, the representative of the Union for the Mediterranean, Fatiha Hassouni, spoke about the organization's forthcoming ministerial meeting and dialogue, which would bring together stakeholders from across the region to discuss issues such as coordination on national strategies, research on violent extremism and policy responses to migration and the refugee crisis.

**Importance of high-impact national action plans**

Throughout the discussions, participants emphasized that national strategies must have a direct impact on the lives of men and women around the world. Mr. Jacevic highlighted several key elements as features of high-impact national action plans, including:

(a) Cultivating political will within all implementing bodies and at all levels;

(b) Ensuring coordination across responsible government agencies and implementing partners;

(c) Engaging civil society throughout the design, implementation and evaluation stages;

(d) Dedicating funding to the implementation of national action plans, including costing measures;

(e) Building technical skills and devoting resources to monitoring and evaluation.

The Deputy Director of the United Nations Coordination and Conflict Resolution Unit at the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, Paula Molloy, and a Senior Adviser at the Agency for Gender Equality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kika Babic-Svetlin, provided examples of how, after assessing their previous national action plans, they had identified improvements for the next iteration of the plan. Advances included using a theory of change to identify the overall objectives and desired effects, streamlining and reducing indicators to focus on real impact and making the national action plan design process more inclusive by expanding the actors involved in its design beyond traditional peace and security agencies. The Head of the United Nations Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Morocco, Redouane Houssaini, noted that, although Morocco did not have a national action plan on women and peace and security, the Government was conducting women and peace and security programmes, such as those in the framework of the Mediation in the Mediterranean initiative in partnership with Spain and other members of the initiative. He agreed that a national action plan

would be a helpful tool to coordinate activities across the Government. Throughout the discussion, participants noted that it was critical for work under national action plans to be reported publicly and regularly through mechanisms such as parliamentary hearings, shadow reports or international forums.

**Specific action and closing**

Participants were asked to consider potential commitments and suggestions that they would like to recommend to their Governments with regard to national action plans and policies on women and peace and security. Commitments included:

(a) Continue to speak with security colleagues and seek coherence on policies on preventing and countering violent extremism (Finland);

(b) Continue to work on localization and encouraging donor country partners to look at ways to develop local ownership (Global Network of Women Peacebuilders);

(c) Review the monitoring and evaluation framework to incorporate some of the insights from the meetings, such as fewer but more specific indicators (Kenya);

(d) Incorporate elements of diversities and differences (Thailand);

(e) Consider how best to provide long-term commitment and support to civil society (Norway);

(f) Institutionalize civil society engagement and relationships throughout the national action plan (Canada);

(g) Incorporate new and emerging themes in the next national action plan (Norway).

A request was made for the next Network meeting to include a session on establishing or re-establishing national action plans for those countries that did not have an active plan.

At the close of the event, the representative of UN-Women said that the entity would host the secretariat for the Network in New York and mentioned that the recruitment of a staff member to support the Network was under way. Among other tasks, the Network coordinator would:

(a) Establish and maintain a database of focal points;

(b) Produce regular newsletters to promote new research, best practices and funding and capacity-building opportunities and map national and regional women and peace and security actions and initiatives;

(c) Provide technical and logistical support for the biannual and expert meetings.

The representative also noted that the secretariat would need sustained engagement and funding from Member States moving forward to support those activities. Spain, which would organize a follow-up Network meeting in New York in the third quarter of 2017, emphasized the importance of building a real network through which focal points would be able to share information and exchange best practices. The representative of Germany confirmed the country's commitment to serving as host for the next meeting of the Network, likely to be held in April or May 2018 in Berlin. The meeting would aim to build upon the strong progress made in Alicante towards exchanging best practices, common challenges and possible solutions, and again include a broad set of actors, including civil society organizations.

## Annex II to the letter dated 6 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Joint communiqué of the first meeting of the Women and Peace and Security National Focal Points Network

We, the representatives of Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, as well as of the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Union for the Mediterranean and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), have come together in Alicante, Spain, on 26 and 27 April 2017, for the first meeting of the Women and Peace and Security National Focal Points Network.

The Network was launched in New York on 23 September 2016, as a cross-regional forum of States with diverse backgrounds and of international and regional organizations, with the aim of providing a space in which to share and exchange lessons learned and best practices in order to advance the implementation of all Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security, including on how to: develop and review high-impact national strategies; integrate gender analysis into all security assessments and prevention approaches; strengthen the participation of women in the security sector, peace processes and mediation efforts; and address conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence.

On that occasion, the founding members of the Network affirmed, as highlighted at the high-level review of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) conducted in October 2015, that Member States and regional organizations remained the most influential actors in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda and, as such, bore the primary responsibility for integrating commitments on women and peace and security into domestic policies and normative frameworks.

At the first meeting, the members of the Network reaffirmed their commitment to promoting the development and implementation of national action plans and strategies on women and peace and security as a tool to systematically integrate gender into peace and security efforts. Recognizing the need to articulate the impact of national action plans more effectively, the focal points decided to continue to develop strategies for the enhanced design and implementation of high-impact national action plans and to close the existing gap between research and practice. The meeting was structured with three working groups on addressing structural barriers to gender equality, preventing and countering violent extremism and national action plans and civil society engagement in the design and implementation of national action plans.

The focal points recognized that national action plans on women and peace and security had the potential to address structural barriers preventing the participation of women in the domain of peace and security. The working group on

addressing structural barriers to gender equality discussed a range of challenges and strategies in that area. The group agreed that the key challenges were the communication of the women and peace and security agenda and the difficulty of integrating a gender perspective into peace and security efforts and its effect on operational outcomes and leadership. Strategies to combat those barriers included broader and more strategic training within peace and security agencies, mainstreaming women and peace and security across legislation, doctrine and planning and business processes and ensuring that senior leaders promoted, implemented and mainstreamed women and peace and security principles.

Considering the growing challenge of radicalization and the rise of violent extremism for the effective implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, the focal points further emphasized the importance of aligning national women and peace and security strategies with any related strategies and policies aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism. Building upon Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) and the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, launched in December 2015, the focal points underlined the importance of advancing the meaningful inclusion and leadership of women in the development and the implementation of strategies and programmes aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism. In particular, the working group on preventing and countering violent extremism recommended conducting or collecting research, including at the national and subnational levels, to better understand the specific roles of women in the prevention of and participation in violent extremism. Participants emphasized capacity-building as one entry point for introducing the women and peace and security agenda into strategies and programmes aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism, ensuring that responses were localized and context-specific.

The focal points reaffirmed the importance of promoting partnerships with civil society and local organizations working on women and peace and security issues. They welcomed the critical contributions made by civil society to the development and implementation of high-impact national action plans. They acknowledged the benefits that an inclusive approach to the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes of national action plans brought to often limited time and resources. The working group on civil society engagement noted significant challenges to sustained civil society engagement and support, such as dedicated funding and institutionalizing the contributions of civil society throughout a national action plan process. They discussed models to address those challenges, including the creation of steering committees at both the national and local levels.

Throughout the discussions, participants emphasized how important it was for national strategies to have a direct impact on the lives of men and women around the world. Several key elements were identified as important to ensure that a national action plan had a high impact:

(a) Cultivating political will at all levels;

(b) Ensuring coordination across government agencies;

(c) Engaging civil society;

(d) Funding national action plan implementation (whether dedicated or in agency baselines). Participants noted that in some cases national action plans had not been implemented, in particular by developing countries, owing to a lack of funding;

(e) Building technical skills and devoting resources to monitoring and evaluation. Regular reporting mechanisms are critical for assessing the progress made on the implementation of national action plans. Participants shared examples

of reporting through mechanisms such as parliamentary hearings, shadow reports or reports presented to international forums.

The importance of coherence and coordination among international, regional and national efforts on women and peace and security was also recognized. Representatives of international and regional organizations shared concrete examples of their initiatives and some challenges to fully implementing the agenda of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

It was decided at the founding meeting that the focal points would meet twice a year to ensure the Network's momentum and sustainability, once in a capital and once on the sidelines of the annual open debate of the Security Council on women and peace and security. Following the first meeting, convened in Spain on 26 and 27 April 2017, Spain will organize the next meeting on the margins of the open debate of the Security Council on women and peace and security, in New York in 2017. Germany offered to host the next meeting in the capital, to be held in April or May 2018, and Namibia offered to host the following meeting, to be held in 2019.

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# Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 2 March to 16 May 2017

## I. Introduction

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) during the past three months, pursuant to the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended in subsequent resolutions, most recently resolution 2330 (2016).

## II. Situation in the area of operation and activities of the Force

2. During the reporting period, the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic was maintained, albeit in a volatile environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. This is notwithstanding a number of violations of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces (Disengagement of Forces Agreement) of 1974, which are set out below. The Syrian Arab Armed Forces and non-State armed opposition groups engaged in exchanges of heavy weapon fire in the area of separation and the area of limitation on the Bravo side. Different armed groups, including the listed terrorist group Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly the Nusrah Front)[1] and the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army,[2] which pledged allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continued to exchange fire in the UNDOF area of operation. Inside the area of separation, the presence of the Syrian armed forces and military equipment, as well as any other armed personnel and military equipment other than that of UNDOF, is in violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. As underscored again by the Security Council in its resolution 2330 (2016), there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation.

3. In employing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed in the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line that it observes. All incidents of

[1] In July 2016, the Nusrah Front announced that it had changed its name to Jabhat Fath al Sham and declared that it had cut ties with Al-Qaida.

[2] The merger between the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and Harakat al Muthana was initially announced on 12 April 2016. On 24 May 2016, open sources reported that both groups were now operating under the umbrella name of "Khalid ibn al-Walid Army". The grouping is assessed as being ISIL-affiliated.



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firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line, as well as the crossing of the ceasefire line by individuals, are violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. In his regular interaction with both sides, the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNDOF continued to call upon both parties to exercise restraint and prevent any miscalculations that might lead to an escalation of the situation. This was particularly the case when responding to incidents of spillover and retaliatory fire.

4. Military activity across the ceasefire line increased during the reporting period. On 13 May, UNDOF observed three armed Israel Defense Forces personnel in a vehicle in the area of separation in the vicinity of the Mount Hermon complex, which constituted a violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. Two of the Israel Defense Forces personnel left the vehicle for approximately 10 minutes, after which all personnel and the vehicle returned to the Alpha side (Israeli-occupied Golan).

5. There was one incident of spillover fire across the ceasefire line during the reporting period. On 21 April, United Nations personnel observed a high explosive impact approximately two kilometres north of United Nations position 22. An investigation team was allowed access to the site the following day, 22 April, by which time only basic evidence could be gathered. The evidence indicated that the impact was likely to have been caused by a round of 105 mm or 120 mm calibre from the Bravo side. UNDOF also observed that a M557 point detonating fuse was used.

6. According to Syrian officials, the Israel Defense Forces responded to the spillover fire with air strikes across the ceasefire line in the Khan Arnabeh region. UNDOF was unable to confirm the Israel Defense Forces air activity or firing across the ceasefire line. Syrian officials claimed that the Israeli retaliatory action halted an ongoing Syrian Arab Armed Forces military operation in the area of separation.

7. During the reporting period, open and government sources reported several additional alleged incidents of Israeli air strikes or air activity in the Syrian Arab Republic. UNDOF did not observe and is not able to verify the point of origin or point of impact of any of the reported air activity described below. On 17 March, open sources reported that Israel Defense Forces aircraft entered Syrian airspace and proceeded to strike targets in the general area of Tadmur (Palmyra); it was also reported that in response, anti-aircraft missiles were fired, with some media outlets suggested that an Israel Defense Forces aircraft was shot down. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently confirmed the operation but denied that one of their aircraft had been hit. It was also confirmed that the firing of anti-aircraft missiles had triggered an anti-rocket alert system in Israel. On 19 March, it was reported that an air strike killed an individual in Khan Arnabeh in the area of limitation on the Bravo side. Open sources reported that the strike was carried out by an Israel Defense Forces unmanned aerial vehicle. On 21 March, it was reported by open sources and confirmed by the Israel Defense Forces that an Israel Defense Forces unmanned aerial vehicle had been shot down in the Qunaytirah area. On 23 April, open sources reported an Israel Defense Forces strike at a Syrian National Defence Forces training camp approximately two kilometres from Camp Faouar that killed three individuals and wounded two others, reportedly in retaliation for spillover fire, that had occurred on 21 April. On 27 April, open sources reported that Damascus Airport had been the target of air strikes by the Israel Defense Forces. In all cases, it was reported by the media that the targets were Hizbullah or associated parties.

8. The berm, or earthwork, in the area of separation remained a concern for UNDOF throughout the reporting period. The berm is over 2 kilometres long and appears to be facilitating movement in the corridor between Hamidiyah al-Jadidah

and Jubbata al-Khashab. The berm crosses the ceasefire line in at least one location and is used by armed groups, thus making the area of separation a target for the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. This continues to have the potential to draw fire, particularly indirect fire, closer to the ceasefire line and the technical fence. During the reporting period, UNDOF observed an increasing trend of incidents of operational activity being conducted by armed groups in close proximity to the technical fence and the ceasefire line. On 21 and 26 April, a self-propelled howitzer, along with six armed elements and support vehicles, fired five high explosive rounds into areas controlled by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. The firing position was located in the vicinity of former United Nations position 60A, in close proximity to the technical fence. Syrian authorities noted that there had been civilian casualties in Khan Arnabeh and that the Syrian Arab Armed Forces were constrained in their ability to respond because of the risk that any spillover fire would draw the usual response from the Israel Defense Forces.

9. UNDOF assesses that military operational activity by armed groups, including the practice of firing in close proximity to the ceasefire line and the technical fence, is a deliberate attempt to avoid retaliatory fire from the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. This activity serves to attract fire towards the ceasefire line, placing civilians and United Nations personnel on the Alpha side at increased risk.

10. Crossing of the ceasefire line by civilians, primarily shepherds, from the Bravo side to the Alpha side continued to be observed daily. Instances of interaction between Israel Defense Forces soldiers and individuals from the Bravo side continued during the reporting period. Such interactions were observed on 15 March in the vicinity of the Alpha gate and Camp Ziouani, and on 20 April in the vicinity of United Nations observation post 54.

11. Relative to the previous reporting period, there has been a significant increase in interaction between Israel Defense Forces soldiers and individuals from the Bravo side, including from the Bayt Jinn pocket on Mount Hermon. UNDOF observed 16 interactions between the Israel Defense Forces and unknown individuals during the reporting period, occurring on four occasions in February, three in March, eight in April and on one occasion in May. The interactions followed a similar pattern and occurred in the same general vicinity on Mount Hermon, close to an Israel Defense Forces position. Unknown individuals, armed and unarmed, accompanied by mules, approached the Israel Defense Forces position and were met by and interacted with Israel Defense Forces personnel. In some instances, personnel and supplies were observed to have been transferred in both directions. On all occasions, the unknown individuals and mules returned to the Bravo side. The movement of unarmed unidentified persons with unloaded mules was observed by UNDOF personnel on 28 March and 8 May.

12. From its observation, UNDOF cannot confirm or verify the nature of the interaction described in the paragraphs above. The Israel Defense Forces have stated that the interactions were of a humanitarian and medical nature.

13. As previously reported by UNDOF, there is a concern that such interaction heightens the risk of clashes between the armed groups and the Syrian Arab Armed Forces, including on Mount Hermon, and this poses the risk to United Nations personnel of indirect fire. On 5 May, Observer Group Golan personnel heard warning shots, then small arms rounds were fired in their direction by two unidentified individuals in the vicinity of the Mount Hermon complex. UNDOF assessed that the shots were intended as a warning to stop its personnel from observing the area. Such activity highlights the risk in the operational environment on Mount Hermon.

14. On 30 March, following medical treatment in Israel, a civilian shepherd, who had been injured on 5 January in a mine incident in the vicinity of United Nations observation post 73, was transferred back to the Bravo side in cooperation with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. In coordination with the Israel Defense Forces, UNDOF transferred the individual from the Alpha side across Mount Hermon to the Bravo side. Throughout the operation, the injured shepherd remained under medical observation by an UNDOF Medical Officer. He was then transferred to the Syrian authorities. The shepherd continued his rehabilitation in Damascus, and has since returned to his home and community in Hadar. UNDOF commended the humanitarian spirit in which both parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement acted in order to achieve the successful conclusion of the incident.

15. In the context of the ongoing Syrian conflict, combat in the northern part of the area of separation and limitation on the Bravo side continued in the vicinity of Hadar and Tall al-Hamariyah, also known as the "Castle", which remains contested. During the reporting period, combat also continued in the Bayt Jinn pocket, consisting of the towns of Bayt Jinn, Mazra'at Bayt Jinn and Mughur al-Mir.

16. The Mount Hermon complex remained stable throughout the reporting period, with the exception of the firing incident of 5 May described in paragraph 13 above. The level of transborder movements of unidentified individuals increased as the weather conditions improved, with two instances recorded in March, three in April and four in May.

17. In the central part of the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side, military combat remained at low levels between armed groups and the Syrian Arab Armed Forces, albeit with consistent reports of direct and indirect firing. Firing continues to be observed along the front lines in the vicinity of Syrian Arab Armed Forces positions towards positions held by armed groups in south Gharbiyah, Qunaytirah and Umm Batinah and the contested area of Samdaniyah.

18. In the southern part of the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side, which remain for the most part under the control of non-State armed groups, clashes continued between the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army on the one side and the Free Syrian Army and Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly the Nusrah Front) on the other. Significant spikes in military activity were observed on 20 February and again on 8 May in the area of limitation on the Bravo side.

19. UNDOF protested all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement that it observed to both parties, including the presence of unauthorized equipment in the area of separation and firing into the area of separation. The Head of Mission and Force Commander reminded the parties of their obligation to abide by the terms of the Agreement and to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel on the ground.

20. During the reporting period, United Nations personnel on four occasions observed persons on the Bravo side unearthing and removing mines in close proximity to United Nations positions. On 11 February 2017, United Nations personnel at temporary observation post 4 observed a civilian picking up objects from the ground in the vicinity of the Charlie gate. The individual collected the items in a white box and returned to the area of separation. On 14 February, United Nations personnel at observation post 53 observed three persons digging up mines from the ground and then proceeding towards Kudnah. On 11 and 19 March, United Nations personnel at observation post 54 observed several persons who appeared to be civilian shepherds searching the ground and digging up items.

21. During the reporting period, UNDOF observed seven locations where 487 tents and other structures appeared to have been set up for internally displaced persons in the area of separation and in its proximity. The number of people in the camps could not be ascertained and appeared to fluctuate. As a result of the closure of the established crossing point at Qunaytirah between the Alpha and Bravo sides since late August 2014, UNDOF remains unable to facilitate, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, humanitarian crossings, including for students, between the two sides.

22. Since its temporary relocation from a number of positions in September 2014, and pending its full return to the area of separation, UNDOF has continued to maintain visibility of the area of separation and the ceasefire line from its positions on Mount Hermon, Camp Faouar, position 80, in the southern part of the area of separation, and position 22, on the Alpha side. UNDOF operations continued to be supported by United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) military observers in Observer Group Golan, who are under the operational control of UNDOF and maintained five fixed and four temporary observation posts along the Alpha line. The focus of the activities of Observer Group Golan was on continuous static observation and situational awareness. Observer Group Golan-Damascus resumed operations on Mount Hermon on 8 May, following mine clearance operations by UNDOF.

23. Through Observer Group Golan, UNDOF continued to carry out fortnightly inspections of equipment and force levels in the area of limitation on the Alpha side. Liaison officers from the Alpha side accompanied the inspection teams. Inspections in the area of limitation on the Bravo side remained suspended because of the security situation. As in the past, UNDOF faced several instances of restriction of its freedom of movement; however, UNDOF, through its engagement with the Israel Defense Forces, endeavours to reduce the delays and challenges experienced by United Nations personnel in crossing through the technical fence to United Nations observation posts and positions.

24. During the reporting period, UNDOF observed 155 mm artillery weapons on the Alpha side within 10 kilometres of the ceasefire line on 21 February and 28 and 29 March. Repeatedly throughout the reporting period, United Nations personnel observed a multiple-rocket launching system and Iron Dome systems at locations within the 20 kilometre zone in the area of limitation on the Alpha side.

25. UNDOF, in consultation with both parties, continued to review the situation in the area of separation to assess whether the conditions on the ground permitted an incremental return to vacated positions in the area of separation. In this regard, the UNDOF leadership conducted reconnaissance missions to former United Nations positions and observation posts on the Bravo side on 2 April and 8 May, visiting Camp Faouar, observation post 71, position 10, observation post 72 and position 25 in Khan Arnabeh and observation post 56 in Jaba. The UNDOF Force Commander also continues his frequent visits and inspections of Camp Faouar and Mount Hermon on the Bravo side.

26. During the reporting period, UNDOF continued to make progress towards the limited return to Bravo side operations in line with the phased UNDOF plan. Work in the current phase of the plan, phase 1, has continued to progress satisfactorily since 14 November 2016, when UNDOF re-established an initial presence at Camp Faouar, and conditions have steadily improved in line with the mission support plan. Building of key infrastructure and accommodation has continued. From an operational perspective, the security and defence of the Camp have been continuously practised, and all deployed elements have been integrated into a cohesive and effective component with clear command and control. Seven armoured

personnel carriers were deployed to UNDOF on 24 March. This is a positive development; the armoured personnel carriers form an integral part of the enhanced force protection and mobility required for current UNDOF operations, particularly in position 80 in the southern part of the area of separation.

27. Since the commencement of phase 1 in November 2016, no adverse reaction to the return of UNDOF to Camp Faouar has been perceived. There has been no increase in combat or threat surrounding the Camp, and no deliberate actions have been taken by any armed group to threaten the presence of UNDOF on the Bravo side. This positive assessment is tempered by the continuation of low to medium levels of military activity in the areas of separation and limitation during this period. The Mission will continue to monitor the situation so as to ensure force protection and the safety and security of UNDOF personnel.

28. From 31 March to 6 April, a planning team from United Nations Headquarters visited UNDOF to develop jointly with the Mission options for progressing the incremental return to activities on the Bravo side. This included the development of options for mobile patrolling by the new mechanized infantry company that is expected to deploy to UNDOF in July 2017 and the finalization of a list of security, military and logistics/support requirements. Conditions permitting, the next phase (phase 2) will commence in July 2017 and will include, over a period of six to eight months, an initial phase of limited patrolling by the mechanized infantry company from Camp Faouar into the northern part of the area of separation. The movement of the UNDOF and Observer Group Golan headquarters from Damascus to Camp Faouar, as well as the movement of the Force Reserve Company from Camp Ziouani to Camp Faouar, are envisaged in phase 3. That phase will also involve the refurbishment of physical infrastructure and security preparations for the reoccupation of select observation posts. A more mobile concept of operations with heavier reliance on modern technology is required in view of the prevailing and fluid security situation. The plans envisage an increase in the UNDOF troop strength from 828 currently to 990, representing 150 troops of the mechanized infantry company and 12 additional staff officers. The plans also consider the requirements for the reoccupation of observation post 52, including in terms of situational awareness and security aspects. Observer Group Golan military observers would not be deployed at observation posts on a permanent basis until such time that adequate accommodation is in place and security conditions allow. During his visit to UNDOF from 7 to 12 May 2017, the Military Adviser of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat reviewed the plans for the continued incremental return of UNDOF and visited the areas intended to be patrolled and the observation posts that are planned to be reoccupied.

29. UNDOF continued to resupply its positions on Mount Hermon and Camp Faouar from Damascus. UNDOF convoys between Damascus and United Nations positions were conducted almost daily and with an UNDOF security escort, accompanied by a liaison officer from the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. UNDOF continued to carry out contingency planning for the reinforcement and evacuation of United Nations positions and observation posts and to update its contingency planning for the relocation and evacuation of United Nations personnel on both the Alpha and Bravo sides, as well as in Damascus. The implementation of risk mitigation, including force protection measures recommended in the military capability study of UNDOF, continued at observation posts, positions and the operational base at Camp Ziouani.

30. As at 15 May, UNDOF comprised 832 troops, including 30 women. Troops are currently deployed from Bhutan (2), Czechia (3), Fiji (301), Finland (2), India (195), Ireland (136), Nepal (191) and the Netherlands (2). In addition, 77 military

observers from UNTSO, including eight women, assisted the Force in carrying out its tasks.

## III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

31. In its resolution 2330 (2016), the Security Council called upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973), decided to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a further period of six months, until 30 June 2017, and requested the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973). The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), will be addressed in my report on the situation in the Middle East, to be submitted to the General Assembly at its seventy-second session pursuant to Assembly resolutions 71/24 on the Syrian Golan and 71/25 on Jerusalem.

32. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties. The Syrian conflict is further reducing the prospects for their resumption and for progress towards peace between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

## IV. Financial implications

33. The General Assembly, by its resolution 70/279, appropriated the amount of $47.7 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017. As at 18 May 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNDOF amounted to $16.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,613.5 million. Reimbursement of troop costs has been made for the period up to 31 January 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 December 2016, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

## V. Observations

34. I note with concern the recent escalation of military activity across the ceasefire line. In particular, the incident of spillover fire and Israeli retaliatory action on 21 April, as well as other strikes reportedly conducted by the Israel Defense Forces in the Syrian Arab Republic, has the potential to escalate tensions and jeopardize the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. While the majority of the alleged Israel Defense Forces air strikes were reported to have taken place outside the UNDOF area of responsibility, the increase in military engagement between the parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement is a serious cause for concern. I encourage the members of the Security Council to support efforts to sensitize both parties and regional stakeholders to the risks of such escalation and the need to preserve the long-standing ceasefire.

35. As previously reported by UNDOF, the Israel Defense Forces hold the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic responsible for any spillover fire incidents to the Alpha side, regardless of the point of origin of the fire. It remains critical that

the parties maintain their liaison with UNDOF in the first instance to prevent any escalation of the situation across the ceasefire line. It is not acceptable for UNDOF to be reliant on open sources to determine the extent of a deliberate violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. In addition, the violation of the ceasefire line by the Israel Defense Forces on 13 May increased tensions. For its part, the United Nations will maintain its efforts to ensure that the long-standing ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic continues to hold.

36. I remain gravely concerned by the prevailing security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, its impact on the Syrian population and its implications for the stability of the wider region. The continued fighting on the Bravo side between the Syrian armed forces and armed groups, and between different armed groups, including listed terrorist groups, such as Jabhat Fath al-Sham, and ISIL affiliates, such as the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, in the southern part of the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side, as well as the firing of missiles by the Israel Defense Forces across the ceasefire line, jeopardize the long-term ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and continue to significantly affect the UNDOF area of operation.

37. The presence of the Syrian armed forces and unauthorized military equipment in the area of separation are violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement. The continued use of heavy weapons by the Syrian armed forces and armed groups in the ongoing Syrian conflict is disturbing and continues to significantly impede the successful implementation of the UNDOF mandate. I note that while there is a reduction in the levels of firing in the northern part of the UNDOF area of operation, listed terrorist groups and other armed groups continue to maintain control over significant sections of the areas of separation and limitation in the UNDOF area of operation on the Bravo side. The established crossing between the Alpha and Bravo sides remains closed.

38. There should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF. I call upon all parties to the Syrian conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operation, and to remove all military equipment and all armed personnel from the area of separation.

39. The Israel Defense Forces should refrain from firing across the ceasefire line. The firing of missiles across the ceasefire line by the Israel Defense Forces has the potential to escalate tensions between the two sides. The continued presence of unauthorized weapons and equipment in the area of limitation on the Alpha side is also of concern.

40. Interaction between the Israel Defense Forces and unidentified individuals from the Bravo side, including in the area of Mount Hermon, has the potential to lead to clashes between armed elements and the Syrian Arab Armed Forces. I reiterate my call to both parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement regarding the requirement to maintain stability in the area. All military activities in the area of separation conducted by any actor pose a risk to the ceasefire and to the local civilian population, in addition to the United Nations personnel on the ground. I call upon all parties to take all measures necessary to protect civilians.

41. As UNDOF consolidates its presence at Camp Faouar and continues its efforts to intensify its operations in the area of separation, it remains critical that the safety and security of United Nations personnel be assured. The circumstances under which the troops and military observers are operating remain complex and challenging, and require continued vigilance and risk mitigation measures. I renew my call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to fulfil its primary responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side. I also renew my call on countries with

influence to strongly and urgently convey to the armed groups in the UNDOF area of operation the imperative to cease any action in violation of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, bearing in mind that such actions also jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations personnel, and to respect the freedom of United Nations personnel to carry out their clear and important mandate safely and securely. The safety and security of United Nations personnel must be ensured.

42. Both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic have stated their continued commitment to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and support for the presence of UNDOF in calling for a return to vacated positions in the area of separation. The full return of UNDOF to the area of separation remains a priority for the Mission. In the next phase, conditions permitting, the deployment of a mechanized infantry company in July 2017 will enable UNDOF to commence limited patrolling from Camp Faouar into the northern part of the area of separation. I count on the continued cooperation of both parties with UNDOF in order for the Mission to advance its planning for the incremental return to operations and positions in the area of separation. As a matter of priority, the technology and equipment necessary to enhance the UNDOF observation of the area of separation and the ceasefire line, and to improve force protection, remain critical. At the same time, the parties must continue to support the enhancement of the liaison function of UNDOF.

43. It is equally important that the Security Council continue to bring to bear its influence on the parties concerned to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate in a safe and secure manner and freely. As long as the area of separation remains militarized and the presence of armed groups and/or the Syrian Arab Armed Forces continues, UNDOF will only fulfil its mandate in a limited manner. It is essential that this issue be addressed by the parties to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and in the wider framework of the Syrian political process. Furthermore, the reopening of the established crossing point at Qunaytirah would benefit the ability of UNDOF to implement its mandate. It is also necessary for UNDOF to continue to have at its disposal all means and resources necessary for it to return fully to the area of separation, conditions permitting.

44. The confidence and commitment of troop-contributing-countries in UNDOF remains a key factor for the Mission's ability to carry out its mandate. I continue to count on the support of troop-contributing countries as UNDOF proceeds with its planning, including in relation to the augmentation of required capabilities, in preparation for the envisaged increased operations in the area of separation. I am grateful to the Governments of Bhutan, Czechia, Fiji, Finland, India, Ireland, Nepal and the Netherlands for their contributions, their commitment and their resolve. I am also thankful to the Member States contributing military observers to UNTSO.

45. I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential, and all the more so under the prevailing circumstances. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 31 December 2017. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

46. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Jai Shanker Menon, and the military and civilian personnel serving under his leadership, who continue to perform the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council with efficiency and commitment under challenging circumstances.

# Annex


LEBANON
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
JORDAN
GOLAN
UNDOF
DEPLOYMENT
June 2017
55 OGG observation post
60 UNDOF position
line "Alpha" or "Bravo"
Inter-battalion boundary
UNDOF Components
HQ UNDOF HQ (Damascus)
FIJI
LOG INDIA
NEPAL (+)
FRC IRELAND
MP
HQ OGG
Line "Alpha"
Line "Bravo"
Line "Alpha 1"
Camp Faouar
Camp Ziouani
PALESTINE BELT GRID
The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the de-limitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
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**General Assembly**
**Seventy-first session**
Agenda items 32 and 37

**Security Council**
**Seventy-second year**

**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development**

**The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan**

## Letter dated 8 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey herewith the records of violations of the ceasefire by the Republic of Armenia in February and March 2017 (see annexes I and II).* During February and March, Armenia violated the ceasefire regime 1,535 and 5,103 times, respectively, and continued the usage of large-calibre guns and heavy weaponry from their positions in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and from its own territory.

As a result, during the two months, five servicemen of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan were killed and one serviceman was wounded.

The continuous occupation of a large part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the armed forces of Armenia remains the main obstacle in the settlement of the conflict and the only source of the escalation of the situation on the frontline and the occurrence of hostilities and casualties.

The sooner the Republic of Armenia withdraws its troops from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the sooner peace and stability can be restored in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 32 and 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

17-09522 (E) 150617

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## Annex I to the letter dated 8 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for February 2017*

| *Dates* | *Direction (locality)* | *Weapons used* | *Number of ceasefire violations* | *Casualties* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1-28 February** | **Agham district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Abdynly and Saryjaly villages | AK | 8 | |
| | Ahmadaghali village | 60mm M/82mm M/AKM | 12 | |
| | Bash Garvand village | AK | 8 | |
| | Chamanly village | 82mm M | 9 | |
| | Chiragly village | 82mm M | 17 | |
| | Garagashly village | AKM/82mm M | 10 | |
| | Garagashly and Chamanly villages | AK | 9 | |
| | Gyamaddynly village | AK | 8 | |
| | Javahyrly village | AKM/PKM | 7 | |
| | Merzili village | AKM/AK/60mm M | 26 | |
| | Saryjaly village | 82mm M/AK/D-30 H | 28 | |
| | Shuraabad village | 82mm M/AK/SVD | 23 | |
| | Shykhlar village | AK/60mm M/82mm M | 12 | |
| | Shykhlar and Orta Garvand villages | AKM | 8 | |
| | Taghibayli village | AK | 9 | |
| | Yusifjanly village | AK/AKM/60mm M/RPG | 33 | |
| | Yusifjanly and Gyamaddynly villages | AK | 5 | |
| | Unnamed heights | 82mm M/AK/AKM | 41 | |
| | Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan | | | |
| | Alkhanchalli village | PKM | 5 | |
| | **Fizuli district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly village | AK/AKM | 34 | |
| | Ashaghy Seyidahmadly village | AK/PKM | 14 | |
| | Ashaghy Seyidahmadly and Alikhanly villages | AK/PKM/OSV-96 | 36 | |
| | Ashaghy Veysalli village | PKM/60mm M/AK | 30 | |
| | Garakhanbeyli village | AK/PKM | 21 | |
| | Garakhanbeyli and Alkhanly villages | AK | 7 | |
| | Garvand village | AK/PKM/OSV-96 | 28 | |
| | Horadiz village | AK/60mm M/RPG/82mm M | 33 | |

*Abbreviations*: AGS, mounted automatic grenade launcher; AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; D-30H, 122 mm howitzer; D-44, 85 mm anti-tank gun; NSVP, 12.7 mm machine gun; OSV-96, semi-automatic sniper rifle; PKM, modernized Kalashnikov machine gun; RPG, handheld anti-tank grenade launcher; SVD, sniper rifle; 60-mm M, mortar; 82-mm M, mortar; 120-mm M, mortar.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

| *Dates* | *Direction (locality)* | *Weapons used* | *Number of ceasefire violations* | *Casualties* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Kurdlar and Ashagy Abdurrahmanly villages | PKM | 8 | |
| | Korgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages | AK | 12 | |
| | Korgan and Shukurbayli villages | AK | 8 | |
| | Namazchala village | DShK/82mm M | 31 | |
| | Shukurbayli village | AK | 5 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/AKM/PKM/82mm M | 77 | |
| | **Gazakh district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Ashagy Askipara village | AK | 5 | |
| | Bala Jafarli village | AK/AKM | 8 | |
| | Baganis Ayrum village | AK/PKM | 6 | |
| | Dash Salahli village | DShK | 5 | |
| | Jafarli village | AKM | 5 | |
| | Farahli village | AKM | 11 | |
| | Gaymagly village | PKM/DShK/AKM | 16 | |
| | Gushchu Ayrum village | DShK/PKM/AKM | 16 | |
| | Gyzylhajili village | AK/AKM/DShK/PKM | 24 | |
| | Kamarli village | AKM/DShK/SVD | 18 | |
| | Kohna Gyshlag village | AKM | 5 | |
| | Musakoy village | AK/AKM/DShK | 8 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/AKM/PKM/DShK | 29 | |
| | **Gedebey district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Bashkand village | AKM | 5 | |
| | Garavallar village | AKM/NSVP/AK | 11 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/AKM/DShK | 12 | |
| | **Goranboy district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Borsunlu village | RPG/82mm M | 6 | |
| | Gulustan village | PKM/AK/AKM/DShK/ 82mm M | 29 | |
| | Gyrmyzysaggallar village | AK/AKM | 7 | |
| | Talysh and Zeyva villages | PKM/82mm M/AKM | 56 | |
| | Tapgaragoyunlu village | AK/AKM/82mm M/PKM/ 60mm M/RPG | 60 | One serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed |
| | Unnamed heights | SVD/DShK/AKM/ 82mm M/PKM/D-44 | 55 | |
| | **Goygol district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Unnamed heights | AKM | 5 | |
| | **Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Mehdili village | AK/AKM/PKM | 22 | |
| | Mehdili and Jojug Marjanli villages | AK/AKM | 6 | |
| | Nuzgar village and Lala Ilahi heights | AK/PKM/AKM | 21 | |
| | Nuzgar and Gazakhlar villages | AK | 5 | |

| *Dates* | *Direction (locality)* | *Weapons used* | *Number of ceasefire violations* | *Casualties* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Unnamed heights | AK | 9 | |
| | **Khojavand district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Kuropatkino village | PKM/AK/AKM | 54 | Two servicemen of the armed forces of Azerbaijan were killed |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/AKM/PKM/SVD | 67 | |
| | **Tartar district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Borsunlu village | 60mm M/82m M | 21 | |
| | Chayly village | AK/82mm M/AKM | 15 | |
| | Gazyan village | AGS/120mm M | 8 | |
| | Hasangaya village | AK | 7 | |
| | Jerabert village | AKM/AK/PKM | 49 | |
| | Karmiravan village | AK/AKM/60mm M/PKM | 21 | |
| | Levonarkh village | PKM/AK/AKM/DShK | 24 | |
| | Nemirli and Gazyan villages | AK/AKM | 8 | |
| | Seysulan and Gapanli villages | AK/AKM | 17 | |
| | Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages | AK/AKM/82mm M | 14 | |
| | Talysh and Yenikand villages | DShK/82mm M | 13 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/60mm M/82mm M/RPG | 24 | One serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed |
| | Yarymja village | AKM | 5 | |
| | **Tovuz district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Aghdam village | AKM/PKM | 11 | |
| | Aghbulag village | AKM/PKM/AK/OSV-96 | 26 | |
| | Alibayli village | DShK/AK/AKM | 27 | |
| | Kokhanabi village | AKM/DShK/AK | 10 | |
| | Munjuglu village | AKM/PKM/DShK | 19 | |

## Annex II to the letter dated 8 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for March 2017*

| *Dates* | *Direction (locality)* | *Weapons used* | *Number of ceasefire violations* | *Casualties* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1-31 March** | **Agham district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Ahmadaghali village | D-44/AK/OSV-96 | 56 | |
| | Ayag Garvand village | AKM/82mm M | 35 | |
| | Bash Garvand village | AK/AKM | 29 | |
| | Chamanly village | 60mm M/AK/AKM | 58 | |
| | Chiragly village | AKM/60mm M | 45 | |
| | Garagashly village | AK | 34 | |
| | Garagashly and Chamanly villages | AK | 39 | |
| | Gyamaddynly village | AKM/AK | 30 | |
| | Merzili village | AK | 32 | |
| | Orta Garvand | AK | 48 | |
| | Saryjaly village | AK/60mm M/82mm M | 43 | |
| | Shahvalylar village | 60mm M/AKM | 35 | |
| | Shuraabad village | 82mm M/AK/AKM | 30 | |
| | Yusifjanly village | AK/AKM | 30 | |
| | Yusifjanly and Mammadbaghirly villages | AK | 49 | One serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed |
| | Unnamed heights | AK | 82 | |
| | Zangishaly village | AKM/AK | 57 | |
| | **Aghjabadi district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Gyamaddynly village | AKM/AK | 83 | |
| | Minakhorlu village | 82mm M/AK/AKM | 86 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK | 92 | |
| | **Agstafa district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Kohna Gyshlag village | AKM/AK | 75 | |
| | **Beylagan district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Garadaghly village | AK/AKM | 61 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/AKM | 55 | |
| | **Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Tazakand village | PKM | 30 | One serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was wounded |

*Abbreviations*: AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; D-44, 85 mm anti-tank gun; OSV-96, semi-automatic sniper rifle; PKM, modernized Kalashnikov machine gun; 30 mm ROP, flare; RPG, handheld anti-tank grenade launcher; SVD, sniper rifle; 60-mm M, mortar; 82-mm M, mortar; 120-mm M, mortar.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

| *Dates* | *Direction (locality)* | *Weapons used* | *Number of ceasefire violations* | *Casualties* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Fizuli district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly village | AK/AKM | 85 | |
| | Ashaghy Seyidahmadly and Alikhanly villages | AK | 81 | |
| | Ashaghy Veysalli village | 60mm M/120mm M/AK | 70 | |
| | Garakhanbeyli village | AK | 71 | |
| | Garakhanbeyli and Alkhanly villages | 82mm M/AK/AKM | 72 | |
| | Garvand village | 60mm M/82mm M | 72 | |
| | Gobu Dilagarda village | AK | 27 | |
| | Horadiz village | AK/AKM/60mm M/PKM | 90 | |
| | Kurdlar and Ashagy Abdurrahmanly villages | 82mm M/AK | 84 | |
| | Korgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages | AK/SVD | 90 | |
| | Korgan and Shukurbayli villages | AK | 65 | |
| | Shukurbayli village | AK | 59 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/AKM | 73 | |
| | Yukhary Abdurrahmanly and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages | AK/AKM | 73 | |
| | **Gazakh district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Bala Jafarli village | AKM/AK/PKM | 75 | |
| | Jafarli village | PKM | 43 | |
| | Farahli village | AK | 38 | |
| | Gaymagly village | DShK/AKM | 82 | |
| | Gushchu Ayrum village | AK/DShK/PKM | 72 | |
| | Gyzylhajili village | AKM/AK | 78 | |
| | Kamarli village | SVD/DShK/AK/AKM | 86 | |
| | Kohna Gyshlag village | AK/AKM | 82 | |
| | Musakoy village | AK | 56 | |
| | Unnamed heights | RPG/PKM/AKM | 75 | |
| | **Gedebey district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Daryurd village | DShK/AKM | 55 | |
| | Goyali village | AKM/PKM | 60 | |
| | Novosaratovka village | PKM/AK | 54 | |
| | Shynykh village | SVD/DShK/PKM | 45 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AKM/DShK | 70 | |
| | Zamanly village | AKM/PKM | 62 | |
| | **Goranboy district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Borsunlu village | AK | 23 | |
| | Damirchilar village | 60mm M/RPG/DShK | 45 | |
| | Gulustan village | AK/82mm M/RPG/DShK | 104 | |
| | Gyrmyzysaggallar village | PKM/AK/AKM | 79 | |
| | Kharkhaput village | AK | 48 | |

| *Dates* | *Direction (locality)* | *Weapons used* | *Number of ceasefire violations* | *Casualties* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Tapgaragoyunlu village | AK/AKM | 123 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/AKM/DShK | 133 | |
| | Yenikand village | AK | 112 | |
| | Zeyva village | AKM/DShK/30mm ROP | 75 | |
| | **Goygol district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Azgilli village | AKM | 16 | |
| | Gazandarmaz village | AKM | 23 | |
| | Pirverdilar village | AKM | 18 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AKM/DShK | 33 | |
| | **Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Mehdili village | AK/AKM | 66 | |
| | Mehdili and Jojug Marjanli villages | AK/AKM | 77 | |
| | Nuzgar village and Lala Ilahi heights | AKM/AK | 78 | |
| | **Khojavand district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Kuropatkino village | AK/AKM | 75 | |
| | Unnamed heights | 82mm M/AK | 143 | |
| | **Tartar district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Borsunlu village | AK/AKM | 66 | |
| | Chayly village | AK/AKM | 115 | |
| | Damirchilar village | AKM | 67 | |
| | Gapanly village | 82mm M | 66 | |
| | Gazyan village | 60mm M/82mm M/120mm M | 70 | |
| | Hasangaya village | AKM | 50 | |
| | Jamilly village | AK | 46 | |
| | Jerabert village | AK/AKM/SVD | 50 | |
| | Karmiravan village | AK/AKM | 52 | |
| | Levonarkh and Hasangaya villages | AK | 73 | |
| | Levonarkh village | AK | 53 | |
| | Seyidimli village | AKM | 70 | |
| | Seysulan and Gapanli villages | AK/AKM/DShK/PKM | 71 | |
| | Tazakand village | 60mm M/82mm M | 111 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AK/AKM/PKM | 101 | |
| | Yarymja village | AK/AKM | 74 | |
| | **Tovuz district, Azerbaijan** | | | |
| | Aghdam village | AKM/PKM | 41 | |
| | Aghbulag village | AKM/AK/OSV-96/PKM | 71 | |
| | Alibayli village | AK/AKM/RPG | 43 | |
| | Asryk Jirdakhan | DShK/OSV-96 | 38 | |
| | Bayramly village | PKM | 18 | |
| | Garalar village | AK/AKM | 23 | |
| | Hajihasanly village | AKM | 13 | |
| | Kyran village | AKM | 9 | |

| *Dates* | *Direction (locality)* | *Weapons used* | *Number of ceasefire violations* | *Casualties* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Kokhanabi village | AKM | 15 | |
| | Munjuglu village | AKM/AK | 72 | |
| | Unnamed heights | AKM | 43 | |
| | Vahidly village | PKM | 8 | |

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**General Assembly**
**Seventy-first session**
Agenda item 31
**Prevention of armed conflict**

**Security Council**
**Seventy-second year**

## Letter dated 8 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting to your attention the record of the cease-fire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces during the month of May 2017 (see annex I) and the record of the cease-fire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic during the month of May (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

17-09509 (E) 140617

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## Annex I to the letter dated 8 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

**1-31 May 2017**

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons/shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 May | Tavush region | 7 | Small arms and light weapons: 58 |
| | Chinari | 1 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Chinari 4) |
| | Aygedzor | 2 | |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Paravakar | 1 | |
| | Vazashen | 2 | |
| 2 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 19 | Small arms and light weapons: 283 |
| | Aygedzor | 6 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Avazan 7; Aygedzor 1) |
| | Chinari | 1 | Large-calibre machine guns: 100 |
| | Paravakar | 2 | |
| | Movses | 3 | |
| | Aygepar | 3 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| | Avazan | 1 | |
| | Daranak | 2 | |
| 3 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 21 | Small arms and light weapons: 330 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 |
| | Chinari | 5 | Large-calibre machine guns: 2 |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Paravakar | 7 | |
| | N. Karmiraghbyur | 1 | |
| | Berkaber | 1 | |
| | Vazashen | 4 | |
| | Jil | 1 | |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons/shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 May | Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions | 9 | Small arms and light weapons: 110<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | |
| | Movses | 2 | |
| | Paravakar | 2 | |
| | Aygepar | 1 | |
| | Jil | 2 | |
| | Yeraskh | 1 | |
| 5 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 8 | Small arms and light weapons: 61<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 5 |
| | Movses | 4 | |
| | Paravakar | 2 | |
| | Aygepar | 1 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| 6 May | Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions | 14 | Small arms and light weapons: 590<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Aygehovit 2) |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | |
| | Chinari | 3 | |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Aygehovit | 1 | |
| | Vazasen | 1 | |
| | Kayan | 3 | |
| | Vahan | 2 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| | Yeraskh | 1 | |
| 7 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 8 | Small arms and light weapons: 60<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 23 |
| | Chinari | 5 | |
| | Berkaber | 1 | |
| | Baghanis | 1 | |
| | Vahan | 1 | |
| 8 May | Tavush and Ararat regions | 13 | Small arms and light weapons: 127<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Chinari 4)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 22 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | |
| | Chinari | 3 | |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons/shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Movses | 2 | |
| | Aygepar | 1 | |
| | Baghanis | 1 | |
| | Koti | 2 | |
| | Berdavan | 1 | |
| | Yeraskh | 1 | |
| | Paruyr Sevak | 1 | |
| 9 May | Tavush region | 4 | Small arms and light weapons: 14 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 |
| | Chinari | 2 | |
| | Vazashen | 1 | |
| 10 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 9 | Small arms and light weapons: 90 |
| | Aygedzor | 2 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 |
| | Chinari | 2 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Aygedzor 1) |
| | Movses | 1 | Large-calibre machine guns: 20 |
| | Paravakar | 1 | |
| | Berkaber | 1 | |
| | Chambarak | 2 | |
| 11 May | Tavush and Ararat regions | 4 | Small arms and light weapons: 12 |
| | Chinari | 2 | |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | |
| | Yeraskh | 1 | |
| 12 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 14 | Small arms and light weapons: 345 |
| | Chinari | 3 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | Large-calibre machine guns: 144 |
| | Aygepar | 1 | |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Aygehovit | 1 | |
| | Vazashen | 2 | |
| | Berkaber | 1 | |
| | Vahan | 1 | |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons/shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Jil | 2 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| 13 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 9 | Small arms and light weapons: 167 |
| | Chinari | 1 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | Large-calibre machine guns: 93 |
| | Paravakar | 4 | |
| | Vazashen | 1 | |
| | Barekamavan | 1 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| 14 May | Tavush, Gegharkunik and Syunik regions | 8 | Small arms and light weapons: 89 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 30 |
| | Chinari | 2 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Chapni 20) |
| | Aygepar | 3 | |
| | Jil | 2 | Large-calibre machine guns: 30 |
| | Chapni | 1 | |
| 15 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 11 | Small arms and light weapons: 314 |
| | Chinari | 1 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Kakhakn 10) |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Kayan | 1 | |
| | Voskevan | 1 | |
| | Jil | 3 | |
| | Kakhakn | 1 | |
| | Tsapatagh | 1 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| 16 May | Tavush region | 6 | Small arms and light weapons: 45 |
| | Aygedzor | 2 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 |
| | Chinari | 2 | Large-calibre machine guns: 1 |
| | Paravakar | 1 | |
| | Aygepar | 1 | |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons/shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17 May | Tavush region | 11 | Small arms and light weapons: 72 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 |
| | Chinari | 3 | Large-calibre machine guns: 40 |
| | Paravakar | 1 | |
| | Aygepar | 4 | |
| | Berkaber | 1 | |
| | Voskevan | 1 | |
| 18 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 13 | Small arms and light weapons: 818 |
| | Chinari | 4 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 |
| | Paravakar | 1 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Chinari 1; Barekamavan 20) |
| | Aygepar | 1 | Large-calibre machine guns: 45 |
| | Baghanis | 1 | |
| | Barekamavan | 3 | |
| | Vahan | 2 | |
| | Artanish | 1 | |
| 19 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 12 | Small arms and light weapons: 352 |
| | Aygedzor | 4 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 |
| | Chinari | 1 | Large-calibre machine guns: 111 |
| | Aygepar | 1 | |
| | Paravakar | 1 | |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Sarigyugh | 1 | |
| | Vahan | 1 | |
| | Chyambarak | 1 | |
| | Kakhakn | 1 | |
| 20 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 6 | Small arms and light weapons: 282 |
| | Aygedzor | 4 | Large-calibre machine guns: 100 |
| | Vahan | 1 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons/shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 21 May | Tavush, Gegharkunik and Vayots Dzor regions | 12 | Small arms and light weapons: 120<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 20 |
| | Chinari | 2 | |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | |
| | Movses | 3 | |
| | Vazashen | 1 | |
| | Kayan | 3 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| | Khndzorut | 1 | |
| 22 May | Tavush and Ararat regions | 7 | Small arms and light weapons: 85<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 7 (Yeraskh 5; Aygedzor 2) |
| | Aygedzor | 2 | |
| | Chinari | 1 | |
| | Paravakar | 1 | |
| | Vazashen | 1 | |
| | Barekamavan | 1 | |
| | Yeraskh | 1 | |
| 23 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 6 | Small arms and light weapons: 203<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Aygedzor 10) |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | |
| | Aygepar | 2 | |
| | Vazashen | 1 | |
| | Berdavan | 1 | |
| | Sotk | 1 | |
| 24 May | Tavush, Gegharkunik and Syunik regions | 8 | Small arms and light weapons: 101<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Vazashen 4)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 38 |
| | Paravakar | 3 | |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Vazashen | 1 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| | Bardzravan | 1 | |
| | Arevis | 1 | |
| 25 May | Tavush region | 7 | Small arms and light weapons: 63<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 |
| | Chinari | 1 | |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Aygedzor | 1 | |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Paravakar | 1 | |
| | Vazashen | 2 | |
| | Baghanis | 1 | |
| 26 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 20 | Small arms and light weapons: 574 |
| | Aygedzor | 5 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 |
| | Chinari | 1 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Aygedzor 11; Paravakar 2) |
| | Aygepar | 2 | Large-calibre machine guns: 30 |
| | Paravakar | 3 | |
| | Movses | 1 | |
| | Vazashen | 4 | |
| | Sarigyugh | 1 | |
| | Kayan | 1 | |
| | Dovegh | 1 | |
| | Vahan | 1 | |
| 27 May | Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions | 12 | Small arms and light weapons: 101 |
| | Aygedzor | 5 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4 |
| | Chinari | 2 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 52 (Chambarak 50; Aygedzor 2) |
| | Movses | 1 | Large-calibre machine guns: 150 |
| | N.Karmiraghbyur | 1 | |
| | Aygehovit | 1 | |
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| | Yeraskh | 1 | |
| 28 May | Tavush region | 3 | Small arms and light weapons: 85 |
| | Aygedzor | 2 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 |
| | Berkaber | 1 | |
| 29 May | Tavush, Gegharkunik and Ararat regions | 7 | Small arms and light weapons: 215 |
| | Paravakar | 1 | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Chambarak 5) |
| | Aygepar | 1 | Large-calibre machine guns: 190 |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons/shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Chambarak | 1 | |
| | Chapni | 3 | |
| | Yeraskh | 1 | |
| 30 May | Tavush and Ararat regions | 6 | Small arms and light weapons: 74 |
| | Movses | 1 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2 |
| | Paravakar | 1 | |
| | Kayan | 3 | |
| | Yeraskh | 1 | |
| 31 May | Tavush and Gegharkunik regions | 6 | Small arms and light weapons: 371 |
| | Aygedzor | 1 | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3 |
| | Kayan | 3 | |
| | Barekamavan | 1 | |
| | Jil | 1 | |

During the reporting period, one soldier of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

## Annex II to the letter dated 8 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

**1-31 May 2017**

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 29 | Small arms and light weapons: 398<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17<br>Grenade launchers: 2 |
| 2 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 36 | Small arms and light weapons: 463<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 53<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Levonarkh 8)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 3<br>Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Korgan 2) |
| 3 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 29 | Small arms and light weapons: 612<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 17<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Gyulistan 2)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 4 |
| 4 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 31 | Small arms and light weapons: 439<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 19<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Mehdili 3; Yusifjanli 1) |
| 5 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 34 | Small arms and light weapons: 664<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 41<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Seysulan 3; Jraberd 3)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 20 |
| 6 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 34 | Small arms and light weapons: 528<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 37<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Nuzger 1; m.Karachuk 2)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 10<br>Small-calibre mortars: 11 (Kurapatkino 3; Sarijanli 6; Talish 2) |

| Date | Direction | Incidents | Type of weapons/shots |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 47 | Small arms and light weapons: 900 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 44 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Sarijanli 2) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 3 |
| | | | Grenade launchers: 7 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 7 (Taghibeyli 7) |
| 8 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 58 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,431 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 65 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 19 (Seysulan 8; Levonarkh 5; Gyulistan 6) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 20 |
| 9 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 43 | Small arms and light weapons: 898 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 35 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 3; Talish 6) |
| | | | Grenade launchers: 3 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 12 (Darchinar 8; Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli 3; Talish 1) |
| 10 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 49 | Small arms and light weapons: 885 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 46 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 5; Gyulistan 6) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 22 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 3 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 3) |
| 11 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 44 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,557 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 49 (m.Karachuk 44; Geytape 4; Yarmja 1) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 50 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Seysulan 4) |
| | | | Artillery: 8 (Seysulan 8) |
| 12 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 51 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,803 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 4 (Gyulistan 4) |

| Date | Direction | Incidents | Type of weapons/shots |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Grenade launchers: 12 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 19 (Nuzger 12; Horadiz 1; Talish 6) |
| 13 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 59 | Small arms and light weapons: 2,221 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 40 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Mehdili 1) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 30 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 1; Korgan 1) |
| 14 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 60 | Small arms and light weapons: 694 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 54 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 28 (m. Karachuk 4; Talish 2; Verin Chaylu 2; Choporlu 20) |
| | | | Grenade launchers: 6 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 11 (Verin Chaylu 11) |
| | | | Artillery: 65 |
| 15 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 43 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,017 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 43 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Tallish 2) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 5 |
| 16 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 41 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,126 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Jraberd 4; Levonarkh 1; Gyulistan 3) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 78 |
| | | | Grenade launchers: 9 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 3 (Tallish 3) |
| | | | Artillery: 2 (Kurapatkino 2) |
| 17 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 47 | Small arms and light weapons: 828 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Levonarkh 2; Jraberd 2; Gyulistan 5) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 35 |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Grenade launchers: 5 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 45 (Taghibeyli 4; Shikhlyar 17; Levonarkh 5; Verin Chaylu 19) |
| 18 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 46 | Small arms and light weapons: 557 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Verin Cahylu 2) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 36 |
| | | | Grenade launchers: 23 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Gyulistan 4) |
| | | | Artillery: 18 (Jraberd 18) |
| 19 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 63 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,289 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 27 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 24 (Mehdili 5; Gyulistan 16; Choporlu 3) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 37 |
| | | | Grenade launchers: 1 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Kurapatkino 1; Verin Chaylu 1) |
| 20 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 73 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,536 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 32 (Mehdili 5; Ashaghi Veysali 10; Yarmja 2; Namerli 2; Verin Chaylu 7; Gyulistan 6) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 32 |
| | | | Grenade launchers: 32 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Yarmja 2) |
| 21 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 67 | Small arms and light weapons: 923 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Bash Karvend 1; Yarmja 10; Verin Chaylu 7) |
| 22 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 52 | Small arms and light weapons: 775 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Jraberd 1) |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 4 (Verin Chaylu 4) |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 23 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 84 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,549<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 45 (Horadiz 45)<br>Grenade launchers: 20<br>Small-calibre mortars: 9 (Verin Chaylu 9)<br>Artillery: 9 (Geytape 9) |
| 24 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 74 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,078<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 22<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Dastagir 3)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 35<br>Grenade launchers: 37<br>Small-calibre mortars: 14 (Mehdili 10; Nuzger 4) |
| 25 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 42 | Small arms and light weapons: 527<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 34 (Horadiz 2, Mehdili 12; Seysulan 1; Talish 5; Verin Chaylu 14) |
| 26 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 65 | Small arms and light weapons: 1,459<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 25 (m.Karachuk 2; Yarmja 23)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 20 |
| 27 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 53 | Small arms and light weapons: 587<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 59<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Shikhlyar 10; Bash Karvend 10)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 84<br>Grenade launchers: 5<br>Small-calibre mortars: 19 (Mehdili 16; Seysulan 2; Yarmja 1) |
| 28 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 42 | Small arms and light weapons: 668<br>Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14<br>Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Mehdili 2)<br>Large-calibre machine guns: 5 Grenade |

| *Date* | *Direction* | *Incidents* | *Type of weapons/shots* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | launchers: 1 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 9 (Mehdili 5; Jraberd 2; Verin Chaylu 2) |
| 29 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 38 | Small arms and light weapons: 733 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 24 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Seysulan 3) |
| | | | Large-calibre machine guns: 12 |
| | | | Small-calibre mortars: 3 (Taghibeyli 1; Yarmja 2) |
| 30 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 37 | Small arms and light weapons: 522 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 8 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 92 (Mehdili 78; Korgan 7; Asahghi Veysali 3; Yusifjanli 4) |
| 31 May | On the line of contact between the armed forces of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan | 29 | Small arms and light weapons: 742 |
| | | | Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 |
| | | | Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Horadiz 5; m.Mrov 3) |

During the reporting period, two soldiers of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic Defence Army were killed and eight soldiers were wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations S/2017/489

Security Council

Distr.: General
9 June 2017

Original: English

**Identical letters dated 8 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring the following to your attention:

1. On 7 June 2017, two gangs of Da'esh terrorists, equipped with assault rifles, grenades and suicide vests, attacked the Iranian Parliament and the mausoleum of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the late Imam Khomeini, in Tehran, shooting indiscriminately and detonating their explosive vests. As a result, 17 innocent human lives perished, and more than 50 others were wounded.

2. These heinous terrorist attacks, similar to those that have already happened in many others cities around the world, occurred at a time when our region continues to go through turbulence and destabilization, which are the outcome of years of effort aimed at exporting radical *takfirist* ideology and bankrolling such extremist groups as Da'esh, Al-Qaida and the like who embrace it.

3. Given that the proponents of the *takfirist* ideology first and foremost despise democracy and election, it is quite expressive and significant that the Parliament was one of the targets of the terrorist attacks, occurring two weeks after vibrant and hard-fought presidential and local elections in Iran, in which 71 per cent of the Iranian people took part.

4. It was very unfortunate that those who have always been at the origin of this radical ideology recently received encouragement and a green light, cemented by the conclusion of a historically unprecedented arms deal. It is not a coincidence that, thereafter, the situation in our region is deteriorating, progressing from bad to worse, with gaps among countries widening, terrorist activities multiplying and domestic suppression intensifying.

5. The terrorist attacks in Tehran took place on the heels of the rejection, on 2 May 2017, of any dialogue with Iran by the Saudi Defence Minister and his utter threat, emphasizing that "we will work so that the battle is on their side, inside Iran". It is not surprising either that the Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs had threatened Iran a few hours before the attacks, saying that "Iran must be punished".

6. In my previous letter, dated 4 May 2017 (S/2017/393), I had warned against the irresponsible, provocative and ill-fated policies of Saudi Arabia in promoting and financing extremist groups and its short-sighted and self-defeating adventurism



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in the region, in clear violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

7. Following the terrorist attacks of 7 June 2017 in Tehran, I would like to ask the international community, especially the Security Council, to seriously ponder over such a dangerous approach to regional security and its grave consequences, and to spare no efforts in combating violent extremism.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2017/490

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2017

Original: English

**United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution**

*The Security Council*,

*Recalling* its resolution 1970 (2011) imposing the arms embargo on Libya and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,

*Recalling* its resolution 2292 (2016) concerning the strict implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya,

*Mindful* of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

*Reaffirming* its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the authorizations as set out in resolution 2292 for a further 12 months from the date of this resolution;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within eleven months of the adoption of this resolution on its implementation;

3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

17-09587 (E) 120617

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United Nations A/71/929–S/2017/491

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
13 June 2017

Original: English

**General Assembly**
**Seventy-first session**
Agenda item 14
**Culture of peace**

**Security Council**
**Seventy-second year**

## Letter dated 9 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit the Co-Chairs' summary of the Madrid International Conference on the Victims of Ethnic and Religious Violence in the Middle East, held on 24 May 2017 in Madrid, as well as the Madrid Priorities for Action (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 14, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Román **Oyarzun**

17-09719 (E) 200617

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## Annex

# Madrid International Conference on the Victims of Ethnic and Religious Violence in the Middle East, held on 24 May 2017

## Co-Chairs' summary

The Conference, which brought together 59 countries and 10 international and regional organizations, discussed the efforts needed to support the members of the communities who are targeted by Da'esh and other terrorist organizations for ethnic or religious reasons, particularly in Iraq.

The Madrid Conference is a continuation of the open debate held by the Security Council on 27 March 2015 and the International Conference on the Victims of Ethnic and Religious Violence in the Middle East held in Paris on 8 September 2015, which was co-chaired by France and Jordan. At the Paris Conference, an action plan was presented which set forth a road map for the international community to support those who are persecuted for ethnic or religious reasons, highlighting three priorities:

- Humanitarian priorities: to respond to the immediate needs of people in danger and to prepare and facilitate the voluntary and lasting return of displaced persons under safe conditions.
- Political priorities: to promote political solutions that are inclusive and respectful of human rights for all, regardless of their ethnic or religious origin, and preserve the cultural diversity of the Middle East.
- Judicial priorities: to put an end to the impunity of persons who have perpetrated crimes — some of which may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity or even genocide — against people on the grounds of their ethnic or religious origin.

The participants reiterated their support for the Co-Chairs' conclusions of the Paris Conference and the Paris Action Plan as a viable tool to address the dramatic situation of persons belonging to communities targeted by Da'esh, and other terrorist organizations, and to preserve those communities and cultures whose existence is threatened by terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria.

The aim of the Madrid Conference was to take stock of what had been done to date from the Paris Action Plan and, mainly, to determine which priorities are currently most urgent, taking into account the situation on the ground, in particular in Iraq, as well as identifying programmes, projects and actions, consistent with the needs of the Iraqi Government, to enable displaced populations to return to their homelands and to foster reconciliation and stabilization efforts, in cooperation with the already existing mechanisms that deal with the stabilization efforts.

In this regard, the participants commended the prominent achievements of the Iraqi army in liberating Mosul and other governorates and areas in Iraq from terrorists; and supported all the efforts aimed at restoring safety and security in Iraq and achieving national reconciliation through a political process that sustains the state of citizenship and ensures justice and equality for all the components of the Iraqi people, in a stable and secure nation, without exclusion or discrimination.

### General political positions

The participants emphasized that, for the region, the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity of the Middle East represented a priceless heritage and should be preserved. To this end, practical programmes should be adopted to achieve progress

in crisis settlement efforts, achieve sustainable development, create opportunities and establish the values of democracy, human rights, citizenship and equality, which shall enhance the collective national identity and protect the national State and prevent racial and sectarian disintegration, towards a region of peace, enlightenment and prosperity. Terrorist organizations such as Da'esh, which is promoting religious and ethnic hatred, are committing the worst kind of atrocities and human rights abuses, of which Muslim populations are the first victims. The participants expressed their determination to redouble their efforts to restore peace and support all refugees and displaced persons, as well as the countries that host them. The contributions of those countries were praised, and they furthermore should be supported.

They agreed that a key goal of the international community and the countries concerned was to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homelands, by creating a conducive environment for their return. The ongoing efforts exerted by the international coalition against Da'esh were praised.

**Priority areas**

Some participants presented the actions and programmes that had been implemented since the presentation of the Paris Action Plan. Given the situation on the ground, humanitarian assistance to the displaced populations had been an important priority.

In this context, a number of priorities and projects were identified on which work could be done in the short and medium term, and which translated into specific commitments from participants.

The participants were invited to draw on the Paris Action Plan and the Madrid Priorities to carry out concrete actions ahead of the follow-up conference, announced for 2018 by the Government of Belgium.

Ayman **Safadi**
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Alfonso **Dastis**
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
of the Kingdom of Spain

## Madrid Priorities for Action

The Madrid Priorities, presented during the International Conference on the Victims of Ethnic and Religious Violence in the Middle East held on 24 May 2017, are intended to address the most urgent actions needed at this moment to address the dramatic situation of persons belonging to communities targeted for ethnic or religious reasons by Da'esh and other terrorist organizations and threatened as such. Beyond the solidarity that must benefit all victims of conflict and violence, there is a pressing necessity to protect and preserve those communities and cultures whose very existence is threatened in Iraq and Syria.

Faced with this challenge, the Madrid Priorities will serve as a road map for the international community's immediate response. The aim is to identify — within these priorities — programmes, projects and actions to enable displaced populations to return and to foster reconciliation and stabilization. Participants are encouraged to draw on it to carry out concrete measures, ahead of the follow-up conference, announced for 2018 by the Belgian Government.

**Priority areas**

Many actions and programmes have been implemented by States and international organizations since the presentation of the Paris Action Plan on 8 September 2015. Given the situation on the ground, humanitarian assistance to the displaced populations has been an important priority in its implementation.

In view of changes in the military and political situation, with more areas liberated from Da'esh and other terrorist organizations, the international community can support programmes in order to enable the members of minorities who so wish to return to and resettle their regions of origin.

In this context, a number of priorities and projects have been identified on which work can be done in the short and medium term.

## 1. Helping endangered populations and facilitating their return

Helping endangered populations has a twofold objective:

- Meeting the pressing needs of displaced persons to ensure decent living conditions for them, and continuing humanitarian aid efforts, to support countries in the region most affected by the influx of refugees — Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey — and for host communities in those countries.
- As material and safety conditions gradually permit, assisting different populations in returning voluntarily to their places of origin and guaranteeing their safety, protection and access to basic social services.

**Priority areas for action**

Prioritize a comprehensive approach that combines humanitarian aid, stabilization and development. Several major areas for the implementation of projects have been identified, especially in the governorate of Ninawa. Participants are encouraged to support actions in these areas, in coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Improving security: support the Iraqi Government, local authorities and Iraqi security forces as they secure the areas won back from Da'esh, in order to facilitate the voluntary return of all displaced populations to their homes, under sufficient security conditions. The security of routes and the protection of towns and villages have been identified as one of the most urgent priorities in order for the displaced populations to voluntarily return:

- Support training and equipment to local police and security units.
- Encourage an inclusive representation in the security forces from all components of society.

Demining:

- Clear land and property of mines and improvised explosive devices.

Stabilization: strengthen support to the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization. The priority is to support rapid reconstruction efforts:

- Homes: the reconstruction and repair of homes has been identified as a priority for action. In the Ninawa plains, 65 per cent of homes are partially damaged, 32 per cent burned and 3 per cent totally damaged.
- Power and water supplies.
- Re-establishment of health-care and education systems.

Economic empowerment:

- Microfinance and small and medium-sized enterprise initiatives. Support microenterprise projects in Ninawa and Sinjar, particularly those supporting female heads of households.
- Agricultural livelihood projects.
- Vocational training programmes.

Special projects:

- Special support for women and children affected by conflict. Special projects to assist vulnerable communities.
- Participation of vulnerable communities in reconciliation and stabilization efforts.
- Help internally displaced persons to obtain identification documents.

**2. Maintaining diversity and plurality in the Middle East**

- The Conference is a reminder of the need to reinforce the inclusive nature of institutions and to organize fair, responsible and inclusive participation of all the elements of society as regards public policy and missions that are overseen by the State; and that all of this must be done at the State level, through central and regional governments.
- The international community reiterates its support for the Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, and praises the reconciliation process that he has initiated with measures aimed at contributing to national reconciliation, promoting inclusiveness, strengthening social cohesion and reforming the security sector.
- The international community reiterates its support for the work carried out by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).
- The objective of ensuring full, equal citizenship for all people is also reaffirmed.

**Priority areas for action**

Reconciliation:

- Facilitation of local reconciliation processes, promoting diversity, rebuilding trust among communities and addressing the root causes of violent extremism. Encourage religious and community leaders to denounce violence that propagates hatred, sectarianism and religious and cultural intolerance and take a leading role in promoting tolerance and peaceful coexistence.
- Promote intercultural dialogue and interfaith and intra-faith dialogue in the Middle East. Support the work of international organizations and institutions such as the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue and the Anna Lindh Foundation in this field, particularly with regard to young people.

Education:

- Tolerance and inclusion training programmes for teachers and students.
- Emphasize education and youth outreach. Promotion of an education project on tolerance with youth, including social media.
- Support curriculum reform with a view to promoting tolerance, including through the teaching of the history of cultural diversity in the region, as well as respect for cultural diversity in secular and religious schools in the Middle East.

- Deradicalization programmes and child soldiers' reintegration.

Security sector reform:

- Support programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Iraq.

### 3. Protecting endangered heritage

- Safeguarding and promoting the millennia-old heritage of the Middle East is an essential component of efforts to maintain cultural diversity and promote trust and confidence between communities in the region.

- Support for the implementation of the Strategy for Reinforcing UNESCO's Action for the Protection of Culture and the Promotion of Cultural Pluralism in the Event of Armed Conflict, adopted in 2015, and its relevant action plan, including the response plan on the protection and conservation of cultural heritage in liberated areas of Iraq, which is being prepared based on the recommendation of the international conference co-organized by the Ministry of Culture of Iraq and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and held in February 2015 at UNESCO headquarters in Paris.

- Need to strengthen international cooperation to ensure the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2253 (2015) and 2347 (2017), as well as resolutions 1483 (2003) and 2199 (2015), which impose a ban on the trade of Iraqi and Syrian cultural heritage, to fight against illicit trafficking of cultural property.

**Priority areas for action**

- Comprehensive damage assessment of religious heritage that has been affected/destroyed during the conflict and identify short- and medium-term needs for recovery.

- Restoration of destroyed religious heritage monuments and sites with specific significance for ethnic and religious communities in the Middle East. Restoration of shared religious heritage, notably the site of Nabi Yunus/the tomb of Jonah in Mosul, as a priority, given its contribution to both cultural recovery and social cohesion.

- Planning the recovery of historical cities, emblems of cultural diversity, notably Aleppo and Mosul, giving equal attention to physical rehabilitation and to the rebuilding of a social fabric of cultural diversity. Provide technical assistance and training to the Iraqi and Syrian heritage profession and communities with a view to enhancing capacity for protection and conservation of the heritage sites.

### 4. Fighting impunity and ensuring justice

- Condemnation in the strongest terms of the heinous crimes committed, especially by Da'esh and its affiliated groups, against civilian populations from all ethnic, religious or other backgrounds. The atrocities committed in Iraq and Syria, which may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, or even genocide in the case of certain communities, are a source of concern for the entire international community and must not go unpunished.

- Support actions aimed at documenting Da'esh's widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the human rights of minorities in Iraq and Syria and obtaining recognition of the nature of the crimes committed.

- Support a role for the International Criminal Court in handling the most serious crimes, in particular regarding crimes committed on the basis of religion or ethnicity.

- Preservation of evidence of crimes is a priority. Support for the launch of an initiative by the Secretary-General to promote the creation of a mechanism — with no jurisdictional scope — to gather and preserve evidence of the crimes committed by Da'esh in Iraq.

- The competent United Nations bodies are invited to continue their work on the violent acts committed and their reporting thereof.

**Priority areas for action**

Evidence collection:

- Mass graves and victims identification. Training of in-country experts on excavation and forensics. Forensic storage and laboratory support. Technical assistance for documentation efforts.

Support accountability efforts:

- Technical assistance for the Iraqi police force and judiciary.

- Establishment of memorials and/or a national day of remembrance to foster reconciliation.

Psychological support for survivors:

- Mental health counselling programmes for internally displaced persons in Iraq and in receiving countries. Training programmes for mental health counsellors and development of undergraduate training programmes.

The participants are asked to take concrete action to pursue the goals of the Conference, protect the threatened communities in the Middle East and preserve the diversity of the region.

The United Nations agencies have presented the following projects and programmes to the Conference in order to pursue the implementation of actions in the priority areas identified:

- Project for capacity-building of the Minority Directorate of the National Reconciliation Committee in the Office of the Prime Minister of Iraq by UNAMI.

- Housing recovery and properties restitutions programme for Iraqi minorities in Ninawa by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

- Protection of minority children in agricultural labour project by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

- Support for integrated reconciliation project by UNDP.

- Launch of a regional educational and cultural initiative entitled "Exploring the past, building a future of coexistence: an initiative for intercultural skills and dialogue in the Middle East" by UNESCO.

The United Nations agencies have expressed the intention to convene an experts' meeting in New York and in the region for follow-up on these actions and projects.

The participants in the Conference are invited to draw from these priorities to carry out concrete actions ahead of the follow-up conference, announced for 2018 by the Government of Belgium.

United Nations S/2017/492

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 June 2017
English
Original: Russian

**Letter dated 9 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 7-9 June 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) P. **Ilichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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## Annex to the letter dated 9 June 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

## Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (7 June 2017)

### Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: two in Damascus, two in Dar'a and two in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported five violations: four in Dar'a governorate and one in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

### Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out six humanitarian operations, including: five operations in Aleppo city, delivering 1.2 tons of food products to the local population; and the delivery of 2.5 tons of food products to the local population of Nashabiyah in Damascus governorate.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to 1,153 people.

In total, 1,317 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian military medical personnel have provided medical assistance to 281 people.

Two humanitarian operations have been carried out through the United Nations: a humanitarian convoy of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent was dispatched from Aleppo city to Afrin in Aleppo governorate; and the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

### Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,547.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 219.

# Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (8 June 2017)

## Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire in Damascus governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported three violations: two in Dar'a governorate and one in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

## Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out four humanitarian operations: three operations were carried out in Aleppo city, delivering 3.6 tons of drinking water to the local population; and 2 tons of food parcels were delivered to Ladhiqiyah city.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 5.6 tons.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to 1,745 people.

In total, 1,321 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

Russian military medical personnel have provided medical assistance during humanitarian operations carried out over the past 24 hours.

Three humanitarian operations were carried out through the United Nations: a humanitarian convoy was dispatched from Ramtha to Tall Shihab and Tayyibah in Dar'a governorate; and the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

## Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process remains unchanged at 1,547.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 219.

## Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on observance of the ceasefire regime (9 June 2017)

### Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported nine incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Damascus, three in Hama and two in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported eight violations in the following governorates: three in Dar'a, three in Homs, one in Damascus and one in Hama.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

### Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out six humanitarian operations: operations were carried out in Aleppo city, delivering 1.2 tons of food products to the local population; and in Homs governorate, delivering 1.6 tons of food packages to the local population.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo was 2.8 tons.

Humanitarian assistance was provided to 879 people.

In total, 1,327 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

During humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours, Russian military medical personnel have provided medical assistance to 255 people.

One United Nations humanitarian operation was carried out: the Russian airline Abakan Air parachuted a total of 21 tons of humanitarian cargo (food products) near to the city of Dayr-al-Zawr.

### Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, ceasefire agreements have been signed with Sukayk, Barsah, Barnan, Khuwayn al-Kabir, Kanayis, Zifr al-Kabir, Isabalat, Haysah, Mar'aya, Khuwayn al-Sha'r, Judaydat Nawwaf, Burj, Sarjah, Tall al-Khaznah, Mashrafah, Farwan, Mu'aysirunah, Hazzan, Kursiyan, Qatrah, Halban, Samkah and Rubay'ah in Idlib governorate, and with Hawsh al-Dali in Damascus governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 1,571.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime have continued with field commanders of armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, Idlib and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 219.

United Nations S/2017/493

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 June 2017

Original: English

# Identical letters dated 9 June 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing to bring to your attention a matter of grave concern.

Today, it has been confirmed that the terrorist organization Hamas has built a terror tunnel beneath two adjacent United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) elementary schools in the Gaza Strip. The tunnel passes under the Maghazi Elementary Boys A&B School and the Maghazi Preparatory Boys School.

Israel views this information with the utmost seriousness. The discovery of this terror tunnel, operating directly under the classrooms of young children, is not an isolated incident, but rather the latest of deeply concerning attempts by Hamas terrorists to systematically exploit the organs of the United Nations. Such activities not only place the people of Israel and Gaza at risk, but are severely damaging to humanitarian efforts in Gaza.

This latest finding verifies once again that Hamas' cruelty knows no limits, including endangering centres of learning and education, and using children as human shields. This latest abuse is not only a flagrant misuse of United Nations premises and civilian infrastructure, but more importantly, is a direct threat to the safety and security of children.

Time and again, I have warned of Hamas' intentions to continue using civilian infrastructure in future conflict, having already seized materials for this purpose. While Israel seeks to cooperate with the international community to ease the entry of humanitarian aid and construction material into Gaza, Hamas has continuously impeded Gaza's reconstruction, and instead enhanced its terror infrastructure.

Despite the repeated efforts of my delegation, our reports of Hamas' military build-up and use of children in military campaigns have fallen on deaf ears. This time, the international community must not turn a blind eye towards such cynical exploitation.

I call on the Security Council to strongly and unequivocally condemn Hamas and its repeated misuse of civilian infrastructure and designate this group as a terrorist organization. It is of the utmost importance that the Council ensures that all United Nations-affiliated agencies, and especially UNRWA, remain neutral and safeguarded from abuse by terrorist organizations.



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I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council. I wish to inform you that an identical letter has been sent to Mr. Antònio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(*Signed*) Danny **Danon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2017/494

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 June 2017

Original: English

## United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

*The Security Council*,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

*Reaffirming* its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and unity of Somalia,

*Strongly condemning* recent attacks by the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, expressing serious concern at the ongoing threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and reiterating its determination to support efforts, including through a comprehensive approach, to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia, in accordance with applicable international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law,

*Paying tribute to* the bravery and sacrifices made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali security forces in the fight against Al-Shabaab, *commending* AMISOM and the Somalia security forces for the provision of security which enabled the 2016/7 electoral process to take place across Somalia, and *recognising* that security provided by AMISOM remains critical at this stage,

*Commending* the role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in supporting peace and reconciliation, conflict resolution, the state formation process, the electoral process, and the promotion and protection of human rights and compliance with international humanitarian law in Somalia,

*Expressing* its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSOM, Michael Keating, and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and the Head of AMISOM, Francisco Caetano José Madeira,

*Welcoming* the conclusion of the electoral process in Somalia and the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo on 8 February for a four year term, the swift appointment of a Government, the increased representation of women in Parliament and Government, the increased participation and representation of the people of Somalia in the electoral process, and the peaceful transfer of power,

*Underscoring* the need to maintain the momentum towards consolidating Somalia's federal system in this regard, *welcoming* the commitments of the Federal



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Government of Somalia to one person, one vote elections in 2021, *underscoring* the importance of formalising the status of the Federal Member States as soon as possible, and *further welcoming* the commitment of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to reach an agreement on outstanding constitutional issues in close consultation with the Parliament,

*Welcoming* the commitment of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States to pursue inclusive political dialogue to support the peaceful resolution of disputes that threaten internal peace and security, including the recent efforts of national and regional leaders, in particular those of Puntland and Galmadug, to reach a peaceful settlement in Gaalkacyo,

*Underlining* that a capable, accountable, acceptable and affordable security sector, with full respect for human rights and the rule of law, is a crucial part of long-term peace in Somalia and noting that progress in improving Somalia's security needs to be accelerated and prioritized,

*Welcoming* in this regard agreement on the Somalia National Security Architecture endorsed by the National Security Council on 8 May 2017,

*Welcoming* the Federal Government of Somalia's commitment to conduct a conditions-based, gradual handover of security from AMISOM to the Somali Security Forces, including conducting joint operations with AMISOM in order to become the primary security provider in Somalia,

*Welcoming* the Federal Government of Somalia and the international community's commitment to a Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) in Somalia, and *recognizing* the need for non-military approaches as part of this approach in order to achieve long-term human security for Somalis,

*Welcoming* the Federal Government of Somalia's active engagement with the Universal Periodic Review process, encouraging full implementation of all accepted recommendations, condemning the continued violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia and *underscoring* the need to end impunity, uphold human rights and to hold accountable those responsible for crimes involving violations or abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law,

*Recognizing* that this is a critical moment for Somalia, *welcoming* the New Partnership for Somalia and the Security Pact adopted by Somalia and international partners on 11 May 2017 at the London Conference on Somalia, *underscoring* the importance of effective implementation and mutual accountability, and *emphasizing* UNSOM's central role to support implementation,

*Recalling* the Conclusions on Children and Armed Conflict (S/AC.51/2017/2),

*Expressing* grave concern at the credible and renewed risk of famine in Somalia as a result of the severe drought in the context of ongoing conflict, *welcoming* the Federal Government of Somalia's response to the humanitarian crisis, and *encouraging* further cooperation with international and national humanitarian actors to relieve immediate need and build longer term resilience, including for internally displaced persons,

*Welcoming* the generous support of donors to the Somali authorities and the Humanitarian Response Plan, *encouraging* further contributions to humanitarian assistance efforts, and *welcoming* United Nations' efforts to coordinate the drought response and support the Somali authorities,

**UNSOM**

1. *Decides* to extend UNSOM's mandate as set out in paragraph 1 resolution 2158 (2014) until 31 March 2018;

2. *Takes note* of the letter of the Secretary-General dated 5 May (S/2017/404) on the strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Somalia, and *requests* UNSOM to implement its mandate at both the national and regional level including through strengthening further and maintaining its presence in all Federal Member States subject to United Nations security requirements and as the security situation allows, in order to provide strategic policy advice on the political process, reconciliation, peacebuilding, state building and security sector reform;

3. *Underscores* the importance of UNSOM's support to the political process, including the provision of United Nations good offices functions to support the Federal Government of Somalia's peace and reconciliation process, in particular with regards to the consolidation of the state formation, mediation, prevention and resolution of conflicts, and constitutional review processes, resource and revenue sharing, improved accountability of Somali institutions especially on anti-corruption issues, the development of an effective federal political system, and a federal justice system as well as support for the preparation of an inclusive, credible and transparent one person, one vote elections in 2021,and coordination of international electoral support to Somalia;

4. *Encourages* UNSOM to enhance its interaction with Somali civil society at national and regional levels, including women, youth, business and religious leaders, and to help ensure that the views of civil society are incorporated in the various political processes;

5. *Requests* UNSOM to provide strategic advice in support of a comprehensive approach to security in line with the Security Pact and New Partnership for Somalia in order to support their implementation;

6. *Requests* UNSOM, along with international partners, to support the Federal Government of Somalia to implement Somalia's National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in order to strengthen Somalia's capacity to prevent and counter terrorism;

7. *Requests* UNSOM to support system-wide implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) across all United Nations support to AMISOM and the Somali security sector;

8. *Welcomes* the strong relationship between UNSOM, UNSOS and AMISOM, and underlines the importance of all entities continuing to strengthen the relationship further;

9. *Requests* UNSOM to continue to implement its mandate in an integrated manner, and *welcomes* the Secretary-General's efforts to strengthen strategic integration and decision-making across the UN system within respective mandates, including with consideration of the role of women and youth;

**Somalia**

10. *Welcomes* the commitment of the Federal Government of Somalia, in accordance with the rule of law, to address immediate issues of formalisation of the status of the Federal Member States, allocation of powers, resource and revenue sharing, the development of a political system, and federal justice model, and *further welcomes* the commitment of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States to work closely together, and with the Parliament on these

issues, building on the existing work on the constitutional review, and *encourages* dialogue with civil society and the Somali public, including integration of women and youth in this regard;

11. *Emphasizes* the importance of reconciliation, including inter and intra-clan reconciliation, across the country as the basis of a long-term approach to stability, and urges the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States to pursue reconciliation talks at local, regional and national levels;

12. *Welcomes* the commitments of the Federal Government of Somalia to one person, one vote elections in 2021, and the outline roadmap including the commitment to develop an electoral law setting out the legislative framework by the end of 2018 and *stresses* the importance of adhering to these commitments;

13. *Reaffirms* the important role of women and youth in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, and in peacebuilding, *stresses* the importance of their participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, *notes* that women are not adequately represented in governmental organisations at regional and national levels and *urges* the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to continue to promote increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in Somali institutions;

14. *Welcomes* the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States' commitment to security sector reform in particular the historic political agreement Somalia's leaders reached on 16 April 2017 to integrate regional and federal forces into a coherent National Security Architecture capable of gradually taking on lead responsibility for providing security, and the swift establishment of the National Security Council and National Security Office;

15. *Underlines* the importance of swift implementation of the National Security Architecture, in order to develop Somali-led security institutions and forces, both military and civilian, that are capable, affordable, acceptable and accountable with the ability to provide security and protection to the people of Somalia as part of a comprehensive approach to security, and *emphasises* the vital importance of the rule of law and of security forces complying with international humanitarian and human rights law as applicable;

16. *Welcomes* the launch of Somalia's National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, and *encourages* the development of relevant national legislation to implement this;

17. *Welcomes* commitments by international partners to provide additional and more effective support, including more standardized and more coordinated delivery of mentoring, training, equipment, capacity building, and remuneration of police and military forces consistent with the Security Pact agreed at the London Somalia Conference;

18. *Calls on* international partners to establish the agreed coordination and implementation mechanisms in order to harmonize donor support to the Somali security sector, and *requests* UNSOM to continue to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in coordinating international donor support to Somalia's security sector in compliance with HRDDP;

19. *Encourages* the Federal Government of Somalia to fulfil its commitments to sound, transparent and accountable financial management including revenue mobilisation and anti-corruption measures, as set out in the New Partnership for Somalia, and *requests* UNSOM to continue to provide support and strategic policy advice to achieve this in order to reinforce the legitimacy and stability of Somalia's new governance arrangements, bolster the Government's

ability to deliver services, attract investment, and help advance Somalia along the path towards normalisation with International Financial Institutions and debt relief;

20. *Encourages* the Federal Government of Somalia to implement fully the Action Plan of its Human Rights Roadmap and establish its National Human Rights Commission and to pass legislation, including legislation aimed at protecting human rights and investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of crimes involving violations or abuses of human rights violations of international humanitarian law and conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence;

21. *Underlines* the importance of respect for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, especially women and children, by all parties to the conflict in Somalia;

22. *Reiterates* its concern at the high number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), including persons newly displaced by the drought, *expressing* its serious concern at the ongoing forced evictions of IDPs in Somalia, stresses that any eviction should be consistent with relevant national and international frameworks, calls upon the Federal Government of Somalia and all relevant actors to strive to provide concrete durable solutions for internal displacement, and further calls upon the Federal Government of Somalia and all relevant actors to strive to create the conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs with the support of the international community;

23. *Expresses* grave concern at the worsening humanitarian crisis and renewed risk of famine in Somalia and its impact on the people of Somalia, *commends* the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian actors and donors to call the possible famine early and scale up life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, *condemns* any misuse or obstruction of humanitarian assistance, *reiterates* its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe, rapid and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia, including by dismantling illegal checkpoints and removing administrative hurdles, and in line with the humanitarian principles, *underlines* the importance of proper accounting in international humanitarian support, and *encourages* national disaster management agencies in Somalia to scale up capacity with support from the United Nations to take a stronger coordination and leadership role;

24. *Strongly condemns* all violations and abuses committed against children in armed conflict in Somalia, *calling on* the Federal Government of Somalia to implement fully the Convention of the Rights of the Child 1989, and the Action Plans signed in 2012, and *underscores* the need to strengthen the legal and operational framework for the protection of children, including by ratification of or accession to its Optional Protocols;

25. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the implementation of this resolution, including through oral updates and no fewer than three written reports, with the first written report by 1 September 2017 and every 120 days thereafter;

26. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.